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Abstract 
We show that credit default swap (CDS) trading on a firm’s debt positively influences its technological 
innovation output measured by patents and patent citations. This positive effect is more pronounced in 
firms relying more on debt financing or being more subject to continuous monitoring by lenders prior 
to CDS trade initiation. Moreover, after CDS trade initiation, firms pursue more risky and original 
innovations and generate patents with higher economic value. Further analysis suggests that CDSs 
improve borrowing firms’ innovation output by enhancing lenders’ risk tolerance and borrowers’ risk 
taking in the innovation process rather than by increasing R&D investment. Taken together, our 
findings reveal the real effects of CDSs on companies’ investments and technological progress. 
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“I wish somebody would give me some shred of evidence linking financial innovation with a benefit to 
the economy.”  
Paul Volcker (2010), former Chair of the Federal Reserve 
 
1. Introduction 
Technological innovation is vital for companies’ competitiveness and long-term growth, but 
financing it with debt is difficult. Unlike conventional investments, such as capital expenditures and 
acquisitions, corporate innovation produces intangible assets and involves a long-term and risky 
process that has both a high likelihood of failure and some prospects for extraordinary positive returns 
(e.g., Holmstrom, 1989). Thus, fostering innovation requires strong risk-taking incentives, substantial 
tolerance of early failure, and rewards for long-term success (Manso, 2011). Compared with 
shareholders, lenders are generally more risk averse, more short-term oriented, and less likely to benefit 
from firms’ innovation success. As such, prior studies (e.g., Stiglitz, 1985; Hall and Lerner, 2010) have 
regarded debt as a less-than-favorable source of financing for innovation relative to equity. 
Furthermore, among the various types of debt financing, bank debt is viewed as less suitable for 
financing innovation than public debt because banks are less tolerant of risky experimentation and 
early innovation failure than public debt investors (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Atanassov, 2015).  
As an important financial innovation in recent decades, credit default swaps (CDSs) are credit-
derivative contracts in which CDS sellers offer CDS buyers protection against credit events of 
underlying reference entities in exchange for periodic premium payments by CDS buyers.1 If CDSs are 
traded on a borrowing firm’s debt, the lenders can buy CDSs to hedge the credit risk associated with 
their investments (such as loans or bonds) while retaining legal ownership of these investments.2 Even 
                                                            
1 A reference entity can be a corporation, a government, or a legal entity that issues debt of any kind. Credit events 
mainly include defaults on interest or principal payments and borrowers’ bankruptcy filing; in some CDS contracts, they 
may also include debt restructuring and credit-rating downgrades. If a credit event occurs, CDS sellers should make the 
payment equal to the face value of the debt due. In return, CDS buyers should deliver either the current cash value of the 
debt or the actual bonds to CDS sellers, depending on the terms agreed upon at the onset of the contract. According to the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, the size of the CDS market has reached a peak of $62.2 trillion in notional 
value at the end of 2007, making CDSs a major financial innovation for managing credit risk in global financial markets. 
2 CDS sellers have no control rights with respect to the underlying loan and typically have no direct contractual 
involvement with borrowers. 
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if lenders do not purchase CDSs, the existence of CDS markets provides them with a valuable option to 
hedge against credit risks (Saretto and Tookes, 2013). 
Does the existence of such hedging products influence the compatibility between debt financing 
and corporate innovation? In other words, does the availability of CDS trades to lenders affect 
borrowing firms’ (i.e., reference firms’) technological innovation? If so, is the CDS effect on 
innovation stronger for firms relying on the types of debt that are less compatible with innovation? By 
addressing these questions, we aim to reveal the real effects of CDSs on companies’ investments and 
technological progress. 
We develop our main hypothesis based on the literature examining the effects of CDS trading on 
the payoffs, incentives, and behaviors of contractual parties (i.e., lenders and borrowers) to existing 
debt. In particular, we posit that CDSs positively influence innovation by promoting borrowing firms’ 
risk-taking behaviors. While risk taking is essential for innovation, lenders are generally averse to it 
because their payoffs are a concave function of borrowing firms’ value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Specifically, as shown in Figure 1, lenders’ payoffs are linear and upward sloping in the region of 
default and are fixed in the region of repayment. As such, for lenders, higher risk taking by borrowing 
firms implies a higher probability of losses without the same potential for gains that shareholders 
would capture. With CDS protection, lenders’ net payoffs increase in the region of default and slightly 
decrease in the region of repayment after deducting CDS premiums, which increase with borrowing 
firms’ default risks. CDS protection essentially weakens the concavity of lenders’ payoff function, thus 
enhancing lenders’ tolerance toward borrowing firms’ risk taking.  
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
Furthermore, a salient feature of the traditional lender-borrower relationship is that lenders, 
especially banks, protect themselves against default risk by continuously monitoring borrowers’ 
investment choices, even outside the payment default states (e.g., Fama, 1985; Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 
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2012). Lenders’ continuous monitoring may involve hands-on evaluations of borrowers’ investment 
decisions, imposing stringent financial covenants to constrain borrowers’ investment and financing 
policies, and influencing borrowers’ managerial turnover. However, monitoring borrowing firms’ 
innovation investments is particularly costly because of the uncertainties surrounding innovative 
projects and the difficulty of negotiating and implementing covenants. Recent studies (e.g., Morrison, 
2005) show that the onset of CDS trading weakens lenders’ incentives to engage in costly monitoring 
and to intervene in borrowers’ governance because lenders’ claims can be insured via CDSs. Shan, 
Tang, and Winton (2015) find that covenants on a borrower’s debt become less strict if there are CDS 
contracts referencing the borrower’s debt at the time of loan initiation. In response to reduced lender 
monitoring, borrowing firms potentially have more opportunities to direct their efforts and resources 
toward more innovative projects that are riskier by nature.3 Additionally, as laxer debt covenants 
reduce the probability of covenant violations, borrowing firms can achieve greater flexibility and 
tolerance to experimentation, which results in higher-quality innovations (Atanassov, 2015). Taken 
together, we expect CDSs to foster borrowing firms’ innovation by enhancing lenders’ risk tolerance 
and allowing borrowing firms to take more risk in the innovation process. We label this mechanism the 
risk-taking channel.  
Prior studies also suggest several other economic forces that could potentially discourage 
borrowing firms from taking risks in innovation upon CDS trade initiation. For example, in response to 
CDS-insured lenders’ reduced monitoring, a borrowing firm’s uninsured lenders may increase their 
monitoring efforts to control the borrower’s risk taking. Moreover, CDS sellers may fully anticipate the 
incentives of CDS-insured lenders and price them into the CDS premium. To lower protection prices or 
avoid the reputation costs arising from adverse credit events due to reduced monitoring, CDS-insured 
                                                            
3 While borrowing firms do not necessarily observe their lenders’ purchases of CDS contracts, they can observe CDS 
trade initiation on their debt (Martin and Roychowdhury, 2015). In addition, Arping (2014) argues that borrowing firms’ 
managers can generally detect any weakening of lenders’ monitoring intensity.  
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lenders may continue intensively monitoring borrowers in the post-CDS period.4 Finally, Hu and Black 
(2008) note that lenders can separate their cash flow rights from control rights by purchasing CDS 
protection, thereby turning themselves into “empty creditors”. As a result, CDS-insured lenders can be 
tougher in debt renegotiation; they might even be better off pushing financially distressed borrowers 
into inefficient bankruptcy or liquidation for the CDS settlement (e.g., Bolton and Oehmke, 2011).5 
Anticipating tough CDS-insured lenders, borrowing firms might have weaker ex ante incentives to 
undertake risky innovative projects to avoid defaults and covenant violations that trigger debt 
renegotiation. In sum, all these factors (i.e., uninsured lenders’ monitoring efforts, CDS-insured lenders’ 
cost concerns, and CDS-insured lenders’ superior bargaining power in financial distress) might limit 
borrowing firms’ incentives and opportunities to pursue risky innovative projects, thereby weakening 
the risk-taking channel outlined above. Thus, the net effect of CDSs on innovation should reflect the 
tension among various forces, and should be best determined empirically. 
In this paper, we identify 782 U.S.-listed firms on which CDS trading was introduced between 
1997 and 2008. Following previous studies (e.g., Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh, 2012), we use the 
number of patents granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to measure the quantity 
of borrowing firms’ innovation output, and use the number of patent citations to capture the quality of 
innovation output.  
Our CDS firms are not randomly assigned. Some factors that determine a borrowing firm’s 
innovation output plausibly also drive its likelihood of being selected into CDS trading. For example, a 
firm’s investment opportunities may affect both innovation output and the onset of CDS trading. To 
address this selection concern, we follow prior studies (e.g., Ashcraft and Santos, 2009) and use the 
                                                            
4 In principle, CDS sellers, many of which are large insurance companies, can price-protect themselves by charging a 
higher premium if they can infer reduced lender monitoring based on heightened defaults of borrowers after CDS trade 
initiation. However, in practice, it is difficult to attribute ex post borrowers’ defaults to ex ante lenders’ reduced monitoring. 
An easier-to-implement and more cost-efficient protection method is to diversify credit risk exposure by selling CDSs 
referenced to companies in different industries. In doing so, the losses generated by one contract can be compensated by 
premiums earned from other contracts (Martin and Roychowdhury, 2015). 
5 Gopalan, Nanda, and Yerramilli (2011) show that relationship banks of severely distressed firms bear substantial 
reputational costs. Thus, lenders’ reputation concerns may prevent them from being excessively tough in debt renegotiations.  
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propensity score matching procedure to conduct a matched-sample analysis. We include both treated 
(CDS) firms and control (matched non-CDS) firms in the regressions. Our baseline specification is a 
difference-in-differences (DiD) model with firm and year fixed effects, which essentially compares the 
change in CDS firms’ innovation output around CDS trade initiation with that of non-CDS firms. 
Our main results show that CDS firms, compared with the non-CDS firms, create significantly 
more patents and that their patents generate more citations after the introduction of CDS trading on 
their debt. The positive impact of CDS trade initiation on innovation outcomes is both statistically and 
economically significant. Specifically, after CDS trading is introduced, a CDS firm generates, on 
average, 14.8% more patents and 20.2% more citations than its non-CDS counterpart. We perform 
various checks and confirm that our main findings are robust to alternative matching methods, model 
specifications, and variable definitions.  
We perform a few tests to alleviate the concern that the timing of CDS introduction is 
endogenous. Among others, we follow Saretto and Tookes (2013) and employ lenders’ hedging 
activities on foreign exchange as the instrumental variable for CDS trading. The instrument choice is 
based on Minton, Stulz, and Williamson’s (2009) finding that banks using foreign exchange derivatives 
to hedge currency risk are more likely to use CDSs to hedge credit risk. Furthermore, a lending bank’s 
decision to hedge currency risk should not directly impact borrowing firms’ innovation output. The 
instrumental variable regressions generate results consistent with the main results discussed above. 
Further, we adopt an additional identification strategy based on the passage of state-level anti-
recharacterization laws that strengthen creditor rights over collateral (e.g., Mann, 2016). To the extent 
that these laws improve the suitability of debt financing for innovation, the CDS effect on innovation 
should be less pronounced after they are enacted. Our analysis confirms this prediction. Collectively, 
our endogeneity tests support a causal effect of CDS trading on innovation, although we cannot 
completely rule out endogeneity as a potential confounding factor. 
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Having documented the positive CDS effect on innovation, we further investigate the 
mechanisms that plausibly account for our main results. We divide our sample in several ways to 
examine how the CDS effect on innovation varies according to several firm characteristics measured 
prior to CDS trade initiation. We find that the CDS effect is more pronounced for borrowing firms that 
are more dependent on debt financing for investment or more subject to continuous lender monitoring 
(i.e., firms that use bank debt, borrow from fewer banks, or have bank loan contracts with secured debt 
and net worth covenants). These results confirm the role of CDSs as a debt market instrument in 
improving the compatibility between debt financing and corporate innovation. They also support our 
arguments that CDS trading promotes innovation by encouraging risk taking and reducing the 
monitoring imposed by lenders. In addition, we document that the CDS effect on innovation is stronger 
for borrowing firms with lower probabilities of debt renegotiation, indicating that borrowing firms 
engage in more risk taking in innovation when they are less concerned about tough CDS-insured 
lenders in debt renegotiation. Moreover, consistent with the risk-taking channel, our further analysis 
reveals that after CDS trade initiation, firms generate more patents that depart from existing knowledge, 
result in the creation of new products, or have high originality scores. These findings indicate that CDS 
trading shifts the trajectory of corporate innovation toward high-risk, radical, and original inventions.  
Although our findings are consistent with the view that CDS trading encourages borrowing firms’ 
innovation via the risk-taking channel, they can also be consistent with the mechanism that CDS 
trading relieves borrowing firms’ financial constraints (e.g., Bolton and Oehmke, 2011; Saretto and 
Tookes, 2013) and allows them to issue more debt to finance more research and development (R&D) 
investments, resulting in greater innovation output. We label this mechanism the financing channel. We 
design several tests to examine the implications of the financing channel; however, the results do not 
support this alternative explanation. In particular, while more financially constrained firms should gain 
more from the relaxation of borrowing constraints, we find that the positive CDS effect on innovation 
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is not stronger for such firms. We also document that the CDS effect on innovation is not stronger for 
firms where debtholders are less willing to finance innovation investments because of their conflicts 
with shareholders. Moreover, we find that CDS firms do not increase R&D more than their non-CDS 
counterparts after CDS trade initiation. Collectively, these results imply that CDS trading primarily 
affects technological innovation by shaping borrowing firms’ incentives to pursue novel and risky 
projects rather than by relieving their financial constraints. In other words, CDSs promote innovation 
not by increasing R&D investments but by changing the way in which R&D investments are deployed. 
To further confirm this implication, we investigate how CDS trading affects borrowing firms’ 
innovation efficiency, which is measured using the ratio of innovation output (i.e., patents and citations) 
to innovation input (i.e., R&D spending). The results suggest that after CDS trade initiation, CDS firms 
become more efficient in converting R&D investments into innovation output.  
Finally, we study the CDS effect on innovation using three additional measures for the 
importance of corporate innovation. They are the number of citations per patent, citation-weighted 
patents, and Kogan et al.’s (2017) economic value of patents, which is estimated using movements in 
stock prices in response to news about patents granted by the USPTO. Our analysis reveals that these 
measures significantly increase after CDS trade initiation, suggesting that CDS trading enhances both 
the scientific value (measured using citations) and the economic value of patents.  
Our study contributes to the extant literature in two ways. First, our paper adds to the literature on 
finance and innovation. While most prior studies (e.g., Hall, 2002) suggest that corporate innovation 
should primarily rely on internal funds and equity financing, several recent studies (e.g., Nanda and 
Nicolas, 2014; Kerr and Nanda, 2015) reveal the increasing importance of debt financing for 
innovation, especially for large firms. We extend this literature by showing that the risk-transferring 
function of CDSs can improve the compatibility between innovation and debt financing. This finding 
suggests a useful focus for policymakers who are interested in fostering innovation in the economy. 
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Second, our study contributes to the ongoing debate on the financial and real effects of CDSs. On the 
one hand, previous studies have shown that CDSs facilitate credit risk transfer, promote risk sharing, 
and relax credit supply constraints (e.g., Saretto and Tookes, 2013). On the other hand, Warren Buffet 
has referred to CDSs as “financial weapons of mass destruction”.6 Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang 
(2014) reveal a dark side of CDS trading in terms of increasing borrowing firms’ probabilities of 
default and credit rating downgrades. We demonstrate that CDSs can encourage borrowing firms to 
engage in risky experimentation and to improve the efficiency of R&D investments, thereby spurring 
corporate innovation. In doing so, our analysis uncovers a specific micro-level channel through which 
CDSs can positively impact economic growth.  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant literature. 
Section 3 describes the data, the sample, and the variable construction. The main empirical results are 
presented in Section 4. Additional tests are reported in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Related Literature 
Our paper builds on two strands of literature: recent studies that focus on the effects of CDS 
trading on various corporate policies and research on the financing of corporate innovation.  
2.1. CDSs and corporate policies 
CDS contracts enable lenders to transfer the credit risk of borrowers, i.e., the reference entities, to 
CDS sellers, which include insurance companies, hedge funds, and other financial institutions. CDS 
sellers typically diversify credit risk exposure by selling CDSs referenced to companies in different 
industries (Martin and Roychowdhury, 2015). The risk-transferring function of CDSs can also benefit 
lenders, particularly banks, with respect to regulatory capital management because they can assign the 
risk weight to a loan based on the credit rating of the counter-party in the CDS contract instead of the 
original borrower (Martin and Roychowdhury, 2015). Thus, banks have increasingly used CDSs to 
                                                            
6 Letter from Warrant Buffet to shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (February 21, 2003). 
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hedge the credit exposures arising from their lending business (Ashcraft and Santos, 2009). For 
corporate CDSs, the underlying reference assets can be the bonds or loans of the reference firms. While 
senior unsecured bonds are the most commonly used CDS underlying reference assets, banks often use 
the bond-linked CDSs to hedge the credit risk of their loan portfolios because bonds and loans typically 
face default in the same states of the world under the standard cross-default clauses (Shan, Tang, and 
Winton, 2015).7  
The credit risk transfer via CDSs induces changes in the lender-borrower relationship. Morrison 
(2005) and Parlour and Winton (2013) model that CDSs weaken insured lenders’ monitoring and 
intervention incentives. Shan, Tang, and Winton (2015) reveal that lenders impose less restrictive debt 
covenants after CDS trade initiation, suggesting that CDSs substitute covenants for creditor protection. 
Bolton and Oehmke (2011) note that CDSs can turn insured lenders into “empty creditors”, thereby 
increasing their bargaining power in debt renegotiation. Bolton and Oehmke’s (2011) analysis reveals 
two effects of CDSs. On the one hand, CDSs can serve as a commitment device for borrowing firms to 
increase pledgeable cash flows and reduce the incidence of strategic default, which effectively 
enhances borrowing firms’ debt capacities and enables more positive net present value projects to be 
financed. On the other hand, lenders in equilibrium tend to over-insure with CDSs, thus becoming 
excessively tough in debt renegotiation and potentially pushing distressed borrowing firms into 
inefficient bankruptcy. 
Corporate CDSs trade over the counter (OTC). Oehmke and Zawadowski (2017) document that 
both hedging and speculative motives determine trading and positions in CDS markets. In particular, 
the positive link between insurable interest and net notional CDS positions suggests that market 
participants use the CDS market to hedge their debt or counterparty exposure. Although borrowing 
firms essentially have no control over whether there are CDS contracts traded on their debt, CDS 
                                                            
7 Although some “loan-only” CDSs (LCDSs) contracts are linked to secured loans, CDS buyers typically use bond-
linked CDS contracts because of the relative illiquidity of the LCDS market (Amiram et al., 2017). 
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trading affects their corporate policies. Saretto and Tookes (2013) investigate the impact of CDS 
trading on borrowing firms’ capital structure. They find that CDS-insured lenders are more willing to 
lend, resulting in an increase in credit supply. As a result, borrowing firms increase leverage after the 
inception of CDS trading.8 Consistent with Bolton and Oehmke’s (2011) predictions, Subrahmanyam, 
Tang, and Wang (2014) report that the likelihood of borrowing firms’ bankruptcy and credit rating 
downgrades surges after the start of CDS trading. Furthermore, Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang 
(2017) find that borrowing firms increase cash holdings for precautionary motives after CDS trade 
initiation to avoid negotiations with exacting empty creditors. Martin and Roychowdhury (2015) 
discover that CDS trade initiation results in a decline in borrowing firms’ reporting conservatism, 
consistent with the view that CDSs reduce lenders’ incentives to continuously monitor borrowers and 
their demand for conservative accounting.  
Unlike prior studies that mainly focus on the financial or accounting effects of CDS trading, we 
are among the first to show that CDS trading can have real effects on the output and the nature of firms’ 
innovation investments. By doing so, we add to the literature that examines the real effects of financial 
development (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Beck and Levine, 2002; Hsu, Tian, and Xu, 2014; Nanda 
and Nicholas, 2014; Beck et al., 2016) by revealing an important micro-level channel (i.e., corporate 
innovation), through which the financial sector could affect economic growth.  
2.2. Financing corporate innovation 
Financing plays a critical role in corporate innovation, as it enables companies to conduct 
research, to adopt technologies, and to develop and commercialize inventions. Many earlier studies on 
financing and innovation argue against the role of debt in financing innovation (Kerr and Nanda, 2015). 
                                                            
8 Relatedly, Shan, Tang, and Yan (2016) find that banks that use CDSs actively grant larger loans to CDS-referenced 
borrowers. Ashcraft and Santos (2009) document that the onset of CDS trading does not reduce the cost of capital for the 
average firm but leads to a small decrease in the cost of debt for safer and more transparent firms. Amiram et al. (2017) 
provide evidence that CDSs reduce the effectiveness of a lead arranger’s stake in the loan as a mechanism to address the 
information asymmetry problems in syndicated loans. The introduction of CDS trading increases the share of loans retained 
by the lead arrangers and increases loan spreads.  
 11 
 
For example, Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009) document that young and publicly traded U.S. firms 
in high-tech industries finance their R&D investments almost entirely with internal cash flows and 
external equity. They argue that “information problems, skewed and highly uncertain returns, and lack 
of collateral value likely make debt a poor substitute for equity finance”. Subsequent research reveals 
that shareholder protections, equity market development, and long-term and failure-tolerant 
institutional shareholders foster corporate innovation.9  
Recently, a growing body of work has focused on the role of debt financing in corporate 
innovation. For example, Acharya and Subramanian (2009) find that creditor-friendly bankruptcy 
codes lead to excessive liquidations, thereby causing leveraged companies to shun innovation. Hsu, 
Tian, and Xu (2014) provide cross-country evidence that credit market development discourages 
innovation in high-tech industries. Chava et al. (2013) show that U.S. intrastate (interstate) banking 
deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s increased (decreased) the local market power of banks, thereby 
decreasing (increasing) the level and risk of innovation in young, private firms. Furthermore, Amore, 
Schneider, and Zaldokas (2013) find that interstate banking deregulation enhances corporate innovation 
by increasing the credit supply and alleviating the financial constraints of bank-dependent firms. Kerr 
and Nanda (2015) note that bank financing can be an important source of financing for innovation, 
particularly for large firms with tangible and intangible assets that can be pledged as collateral. 
Several studies investigate which types of debt are relatively more conducive to innovation. 
Atanassov (2015) investigates how the choice between public and bank debt influences corporate 
innovation. He argues that compared with arm’s-length public debtholders, banks have more private 
information about borrowers, are more likely to include stricter covenants in debt contracts, are more 
likely to continuously monitor the development of borrowers’ investment projects because bank 
financing is often provided in tranches, and have lower tolerance of borrowers’ risky experimentation 
                                                            
9 See, among others, Brown, Martinsson, and Petersen (2013), Hsu, Tian, and Xu (2014), Aghion, Van Reenen, and 
Zingales (2013), Tian and Wang (2014), and Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014). 
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and early investment failures.10 As such, bank debt may be ill-suited to novel innovations. By contrast, 
public debt investors come from a variety of backgrounds and independently assess borrowing firms’ 
innovative projects. Thus, by issuing public debt, firms can tap a wider range of investors and be better 
able to convince some investors of the merits of a novel technology (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). 
Moreover, public debt investors can benefit more from the upside of risky and innovative projects than 
banks through the warrants and the conversion options often embedded in public debt. Against this 
backdrop, Atanassov (2015) documents that firms relying on bank debt innovate less and have lower 
quality innovations than those relying on public debt. Furthermore, focusing on bank financing, he 
shows that firms are less innovative if they borrow from fewer banks or if their loans have more 
stringent debt covenants.  
Taken together, prior studies imply a pecking order for financing innovation. By nature, debt is 
generally less compatible with innovation than equity. Among the different types of debt, bank debt is 
less suitable for innovation than public debt. Our study adds to the literature by documenting that CDSs 
mitigate incompatibility issues between debt financing and innovation, and thus shape both the rate and 
the trajectory of corporate innovation.  
3. Data, Variables, and Summary Statistics 
3.1. Data and sample selection 
Accurate CDS initiation dates are difficult to obtain from a single data source because CDSs are 
not traded on centralized exchanges. We thus assemble CDS inception and transaction data by 
combining three data sources used in previous studies: Markit, CreditTrade, and the GFI Group. Our 
sample starts in 1997, which is the broad inception year of the CDS market for company names (Tett, 
2009).  
                                                            
10 Fama (1985) describes bank debt as inside debt because banks have great access to private information and are more 
likely to monitor borrowing firms closely after loan initiation. Atanassov (2015) also notes that bank loan officers normally 
lack the necessary knowledge and skills to properly evaluate novel technologies and that they are inherently conservative in 
financing innovative projects due to substantial reserve requirements and lending restrictions.  
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To measure firms’ innovation output, we rely on patents granted by the USPTO between 1976 
and 2010.11 Patent citations are obtained from the Harvard Business School (HBS) Patent Network 
Dataverse.12 On average, a two-year lag exists between the date when inventors file for patents (the 
application date) and the date when patents are granted. Since the latest year for our patent and citation 
data is 2010, the database may not completely cover the patents applied for in 2009 and 2010. As 
suggested by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001), we end our sample period in 2008 to address this 
issue.13 We obtain firm financial information from the Compustat Industrial Annual files. Data on stock 
prices and returns are retrieved from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) files. Bank debt 
and debt covenants data are obtained from the S&P Capital IQ platform and Loan Pricing 
Corporation’s DealScan database, respectively. 
In line with common practice (e.g., Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh, 2012), we exclude firms in any 
four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industries that have no patents between 1976 and 
2010 and firms in financial and utility industries (SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4900-4999). Observations 
with missing values for the variables employed in the regressions are also excluded. These restrictions 
result in a sample that consists of 782 firms that have CDS trading initiated between 1997 and 2008.  
3.2. Variables 
To identify CDS trade initiations for the firms in our sample, we use the first CDS trading date as 
the CDS initiation date. Panel A of Appendix A presents the distribution by year for the 782 firms on 
which CDS trading was introduced during the sample period. Panel B reports the distribution by one-
                                                            
11 We download the patent data from Noah Stoffman’s website (https://iu.app.box.com/patents). A detailed discussion 
on how the data set is constructed can be found in Kogan et al. (2017), who collect raw patent data from the USPTO and 
identify the company (the assignee) to which each patent belongs. They then identify company names in the raw patent 
database and match each to firm names in the CRSP using an automated name matching algorithm. In addition, they also 
validate the accuracy of data extraction and matching by comparing the final database with the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) Patent and Citation database.  
12 Constructed by Lai et al. (2014), the database contains all citations of utility patents granted by the USPTO. We 
download the data from http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/patent.  
13 We use the patent application year rather than the grant year to merge the patent dataset and CDS data because Hall, 
Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) suggest that the application date is closer than the grant date to the actual time of inventions.  
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digit SIC industry. We find that our CDS firms are mainly from manufacturing industries and 
industries providing transportation, communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services. Following 
prior research (e.g., Saretto and Tookes, 2013), we construct a binary variable, CDS Trading, to capture 
CDS trading activities between CDS buyers and sellers on the referenced borrowing firm. Specifically, 
CDS Trading is equal to one in and after the first year of CDS trading on a reference firm and zero 
prior to it. In addition, we construct several variables to measure the liquidity of CDS trading and the 
ease of access to the CDS market for investors: the average number of daily CDS quotes in a year 
(Daily Quotes), the average number of distinct dealers providing CDS quotes in a year (Distinct 
Dealers), and the average number of distinct maturities of CDS contracts traded on a firm in a year 
(Distinct Maturities). 
Our first measure of innovation output, Patent, is the number of patents that were applied for 
during each firm-year and were eventually granted. Patent counts are a good indicator of the level of 
innovation output, as patenting is an important means by which firms can protect their technological 
inventions. Nevertheless, patent counts imperfectly capture innovation success because patents vary 
drastically in their technological and economic significance (Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh, 2012). 
Therefore, we follow Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001, 2005) and use forward citations of a patent to 
measure its quality or scientific value.14 More significant and important patents are expected to be cited 
more frequently by other patents. The raw citation counts are subject to truncation bias due to the finite 
length of the sample. Patents receive citations from other patents over a long period of time; thus 
patents in the later years of the sample have less time to accumulate citations. To correct for this bias, 
we follow prior studies (e.g., Chang et al., 2015) and adjust the raw citation counts using the fixed-
effect approach, which involves scaling the raw citation counts by the average citation counts of all 
                                                            
14 We include self-citations because Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) find that self-citations are more valuable than 
external citations. They argue that self-citations, which come from subsequent patents, reflect strong competitive 
advantages, a reduced need for technology acquisitions, and lower risk of rapid entry. The robustness check in Section 4.2 
shows that excluding self-citations has no material effects on our main results.  
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patents applied for in the same year and in the same technology class. The fixed-effect approach 
accounts for the differing propensities of patents in different years and in different technology classes 
to cite other patents. The sum of the adjusted citations in each firm-year (Citation) is used as our 
second measure of innovation output.  
To isolate the effect of CDS trading on innovation output, we control for an array of firm 
characteristics that previous studies have documented as important determinants of innovation (e.g., 
Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh, 2012). Hall and Ziedonis (2001) argue that large firms and capital-
intensive firms generate more patents and citations. We thus use the natural logarithm of the book 
value of assets (Ln(Assets)) to control for firm size and use the natural logarithm of the net property, 
plant, and equipment scaled by the number of employees (Ln(PPE/Employees)) to account for capital 
intensity. We employ the natural logarithm of firm age (Ln(Firm Age)) to capture the effect of a firm’s 
life cycle on its innovation ability. Firm Age is the number of years elapsed since a firm enters the 
CRSP database. We control for R&D expenses scaled by total assets (R&D/Assets), which captures the 
observable quantitative input to the innovation process (e.g., Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales, 2013). 
Firm-years with missing R&D information are assigned a zero R&D value (Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh, 
2012). Return on assets (ROA), which equals earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by the 
book value of assets, is included to capture operating profitability. To control for growth opportunities, 
we included the market-to-book ratio (MB), defined as the market value of assets divided by the book 
value of assets, and Sales Growth, the logarithm of one plus the annual sales growth rate. Leverage (i.e., 
the ratio of total debt to the book value of assets) and the cash-to-assets ratio (Cash/Assets) are added to 
account for the effects of capital structure and cash holdings on innovation. Furthermore, because Chan, 
Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001) reveal that investments in innovation are positively related to stock 
return volatility, we include the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the fiscal year (Stock 
Volatility) as an additional control. Finally, to account for the inverted U-shaped relation between 
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product market competition and innovation documented by Aghion et al. (2005), we include the 
Herfindahl index (Herfindahl), which is calculated as the sum of squared market shares in the sales of a 
firm’s three-digit SIC industry and its squared term (Herfindahl2). 
3.3. Matched control firms 
By no means are firms randomly assigned to be treated with or without CDS trading. Instead, 
many factors determine a firm’s likelihood of being selected into CDS trading (Ashcraft and Santos, 
2009). To the extent that these factors are also correlated with corporate innovation, our estimated 
effect of CDS trading on innovation is subject to selection biases. To mitigate this concern, we match 
each treated firm (CDS firm) with a control firm with no CDSs traded on it (non-CDS firm) and use 
both treated and control firms in the matched sample throughout our regression analyses.  
To construct the matched sample, we first follow prior studies (e.g., Martin and Roychowdhury, 
2015) and model the firm-level probability of CDS trade initiation in a given year as a function of 
borrowing firms’ characteristics. Specifically, we estimate the following probit model using our CDS 
firms and all non-CDS firms in the Compustat database during the 1997–2008 period and have non-
missing values for the variables used in the model: 
ܲݎ݋ܾ൫ܥܦܵ	ܶݎܽ݀݅݊݃௜,௧ ൌ 1൯ ൌ Φ൫ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ௜ܺ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଶܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௝ ൅ ߙଷܻ݁ܽݎ௧൯,	       (1) 
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. CDS Tradingi,t 
equals zero for non-CDS firms in all years. Because we focus on predicting the likelihood of CDS trade 
initiation, we follow Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014) and exclude post-initiation years of CDS 
firms from the estimation. For the array of borrowing firms’ characteristics (X), we follow Martin and 
Roychowdhury (2015) and include four proxies for borrowing firms’ credit risk (i.e., Credit Rating, 
Investment Grade, Leverage, and ROA) and three variables (i.e., Ln(Assets), Stock Volatility, and MB) 
to account for the effects of the information environment and growth opportunities on the demand and 
supply of CDS contracts. Credit Rating is an indicator variable that equals one if the borrowing firm 
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has a debt rating assigned by Standard & Poor’s and zero otherwise. Investment Grade is an indicator 
variable that equals one if a borrowing firm has a Standard & Poor’s credit rating above BB+ and zero 
otherwise. To further alleviate the concern that the determinants of innovation output may also affect 
the likelihood of CDS trade initiation, we include in X all control variables that affect innovation 
output.15 All independent variables are lagged by one year. Industry and Year represent two-digit SIC 
industry and year fixed effects.  
The probit regression results of estimating Eq. (1) are tabulated in Panel A of Table 1. The 
pseudo-R2 of 0.465 indicates that the explanatory variables can predict the onset of CDS trading 
reasonably well. The coefficients of the explanatory variables are generally consistent with those in 
previous studies (e.g., Martin and Roychowdhury, 2015). For example, we find that larger and more 
mature firms and those with investment grade ratings are more likely to have CDS trading initiated 
during the sample period. CDS trading is also more likely for firms with better growth opportunities, 
higher leverage, or less volatile stock returns.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
We then calculate the predicted probability (p) of CDS trade initiation based on the estimation 
results of Eq. (1). The propensity score is computed as Φ-1(p) for each firm in each year. For each CDS 
firm in the year prior to CDS trade initiation, we find a matching firm that has the closest propensity 
score but no CDS trading throughout our sample period.16 We utilize the procedure above to identify 
matched non-CDS firms for 782 CDS firms, thus generating a total of 16,636 CDS and non-CDS firm-
years between 1997 and 2008. We use this matched sample for our regression analyses in Section 4. 
                                                            
15 In particular, we include R&D/Assets, Ln(PPE/Employees), Ln(Firm Age), Sales Growth, Cash/Assets, Herfindahl, 
and Herfindahl2. Our main results are unaffected if we exclude them from the matching. Robustness checks described in 
Section 4.2 show that similar results are obtained if we include additional variables identified by Oehmke and Zawadowski 
(2017). 
16 The propensity scores are compared in the year prior to CDS trade initiation. A non-CDS firm can be matched to 
multiple CDS firms (matching with replacement). Our results are robust to alternative matching criteria outlined in Section 
4.2. 
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Panel B of Table 1 compares the characteristics of CDS firms to those of matched non-CDS firms 
prior to CDS trade initiation. The results indicate that before the onset of CDS trading, CDS firms and 
matched non-CDS firms are similar in Credit Rating, Investment Grade, Ln(PPE/Employees), 
R&D/Assets, MB, Sales Growth, Leverage, Cash/Assets, Stock Volatility, and Herfindahl, suggesting 
that these characteristics are unlikely to drive the difference in innovation output after CDS trade 
initiation. While CDS firms and non-CDS firms still differ in terms of Ln(Assets), Ln(Firm Age), and 
ROA, they have similar probabilities of CDS trade initiation, as evidenced by the insignificant 
difference in propensity scores (0.003). Finally, we compare innovation output variables (Patent and 
Citation), which are not included in the computation of the propensity scores, and find no statistically 
significant differences between CDS firms and matched non-CDS firms before CDS trade initiation. In 
an untabulated test, we again estimate Eq. (1) using the propensity-score matched sample and find that 
none of the firm characteristics is significant in predicting CDS trade initiation, confirming the 
effectiveness of our matching procedure.  
3.4. Summary statistics 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of our final sample that consists of 16,636 firm-years. All 
variables are winsorized at the 1% level at both tails of their distributions. On average, the firms in our 
sample are larger than the average firm in Compustat because larger firms are more likely to become 
CDS-referenced firms (Li and Tang, 2016).  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Turning to innovation output measures, we find that the average firm in our sample obtains 
78.148 patents and receives 63.703 citations for its patents each year. The distributions of patent and 
citation counts are highly skewed. Untabulated statistics reveal that approximately 54% (65%) of firms 
obtain no patents (receive no citations) in a given year; thus the median number of patent (citation) 
counts is zero. To reduce the skewness of our innovation measures, we use the natural logarithm of one 
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plus these variables (i.e., Ln(1+Patent) and Ln(1+Citation)) in the regression analyses. Furthermore, 
26.8% of the firm-years in our sample have CDS trading.  
4. Main Results 
4.1. Univariate analysis 
To investigate the relation between CDS trading and corporate innovation, we start with a 
univariate analysis of the changes in innovation output around CDS trade initiation for CDS firms 
(treatment group) benchmarked to matched non-CDS firms (control group). Specifically, we define the 
year of CDS trade initiation as event year 0 and compute the average changes in innovation output 
from one year before CDS trade initiation (i.e., event year -1) to t years (t = 1, 2, and 3) after CDS trade 
initiation. The event years of non-CDS firms are defined according to their CDS counterparts.  
Panel A of Figure 2 plots the average changes in the number of patents for the event windows (-1, 
1), (-1, 2), and (-1, 3). On average, CDS firms experience a 17.675 increase in the number of patents 
from event year -1 to 1. By contrast, the average increase for non-CDS firms is 3.798. The difference in 
the increases between CDS and non-CDS firms is not only economically significant but also 
statistically significant at the 1% level (p-value = 0.003). The changes in the number of patents for 
event windows (-1, 2) and (-1, 3) display larger gaps between CDS and non-CDS firms, indicating that 
the positive effect of CDS trading on innovation is persistent and increases over time. This finding is 
also consistent with the long gestation periods of many innovative projects. 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
Panel B of Figure 2 presents the results for the number of patent citations. For CDS firms, the 
number of citations increases, on average, by 18.298, 18.844, and 19.085 for event windows (-1, 1), (-1, 
2), and (-1, 3), respectively. The corresponding increases are only 3.796, 0.313, and 0.556 for non-CDS 
firms. The differences in citation increases between CDS and non-CDS firms are statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.002, 0.003, and 0.027 for t = 1, 2, and 3, respectively). Overall, the patterns in 
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Figure 2 suggest that CDS firms, compared with matched non-CDS firms, experience larger increases 
in both the quantity and quality of innovation output after the CDS initiation year. Since these two 
groups of firms are ex ante similar in fundamentals and in their propensity to have CDS traded on their 
debt, the univariate results are consistent with our conjecture that CDS trading stimulates corporate 
innovation. Collectively, these findings provide preliminary evidence of the positive relation between 
CDS trading and corporate innovation output. Although interesting, these unconditional relations 
require more refined multivariate tests, which we turn to next. 
4.2. The baseline model 
We conduct multivariate regression analysis using a DiD approach. Our baseline regression 
specification is written as follows:17 
ܮ݊൫1 ൅ ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݅݋݊௜,௧൯ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܥܦܵ	ܶݎܽ݀݅݊݃௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߛ ௜ܻ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߜܨ݅ݎ݉௜ ൅ ߠܻ݁ܽݎ௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧,	   (2) 
where Innovationi,t represents our innovation output measures (Patent and Citation) for firm i in year t. 
The key independent variable is CDS Tradingi,t-1, which equals one if firm i has CDSs traded on its 
debt during year t-1. β1 captures the DiD effect due to CDS trade initiation. As we have logarithmically 
transformed the innovation measures to reduce the skewness of the dependent variables, β1 yields the 
percentage of innovation differential that can be attributed to CDS trading. Y is the set of control 
variables described in Section 3.2. All control variables are measured at t-1 in the regressions. We 
include firm fixed effects to control for the impact of unobservable time-invariant firm characteristics. 
Year fixed effects are included to account for the aggregate time variation in innovation output. The 
standard errors of the estimated coefficients allow for clustering of observations by firm, but our 
conclusions are not affected if we allow clustering by both firm and year. 
                                                            
17 For our setting, a typical DiD approach estimates the following regression using the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression: ܮ݊ሺ1 ൅ ܫ݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݅݋݊ሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ൈ ܥܦܵ	ܨ݅ݎ݉ ൈ ܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߚଶܥܦܵ	ܨ݅ݎ݉ ൅ ߚଷܲ݋ݏݐ ൅ ߛܻ ൅ ߝ, where CDS Firm is the treatment variable that equals one if a firm has a traded CDS contract on its debt at any time during our sample period 
and zero otherwise. The post-treatment indicator (Post) equals one in the post-CDS period and zero otherwise. When year 
and firm fixed effects are included, the inclusion of the non-interacted Post and CDS Firm dummy variables is unnecessary. 
The DiD model is then reduced to Eq. (2) because by construction CDS Trading = CDS Firm×Post. 
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The baseline regression results are presented in Table 3, where columns (1) and (2) present the 
results for the patent count and the citation count, respectively. In both columns, the coefficients of 
CDS Trading are positive and statistically significant (t-statistics = 2.8 and 3.0 in columns (1) and (2), 
respectively), suggesting that, compared with non-CDS firms, CDS firms experience a greater increase 
in the number of patents and patent citations after CDS trade initiation. Economically, the coefficient of 
CDS Trading in column (1) implies that after the initiation of CDS trading, on average, the annual 
increase in the number of patents for CDS firms is 11.63 more than that for non-CDS firms.18 This DiD 
effect is approximately 14.8% of the mean Patent value (78.148). Column (2) indicates that after CDS 
trade initiation, on average, the annual increase in the number of patent citations for CDS firms is 12.88 
more than that for non-CDS firms. The citation differential amounts to 20.2% of the average number of 
citations (63.703) across firms. Untabulated statistics show that the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) 
is less than 2, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a major issue in our setting. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
The coefficients of control variables are largely consistent with the prior literature (e.g., 
Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh, 2012). For instance, larger and older firms and those with higher capital 
intensity have more patents and citations. Firms with lower leverage, higher market-to-book ratios, 
more cash holdings, or greater stock volatility are more innovative.  
We perform a number of additional tests to ensure that our baseline results are robust to 
alternative matching methods, model specifications, and variable definitions. For brevity, we only 
tabulate the coefficients of CDS-related variables in Appendix B. In particular, none of the following 
has a major effect on our results: (a) using an alternative matching method that requires a CDS firm 
and the matched non-CDS firm to be in the same two-digit SIC industry to alleviate the concern that 
                                                            
18 Specifically, because d[Ln(1+y)]/dx = [1/(1+y)] dy/dx, dy = d[Ln(1+y)]/dx×(1+y)dx. For example, when quantifying 
the effect of the change in CDS Trading (dx) on the change in Patent (dy), we increase CDS Trading from zero to one, so dx 
= 1. The change in Patent (dy) from its mean value (78.148) is then equal to 0.147×(1+78.148)×1 = 11.63, which amounts 
to 14.8% of the mean value of Patent. 
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our results are driven by the industry differences between the two groups of firms;19 (b) including 
additional variables identified by Oehmke and Zawadowski (2017) to predict the introduction of CDS 
trading in Eq. (1);20 (c) running negative binomial regressions (instead of OLS regressions) to address 
the issue that patent and citation counts are non-negative and discrete; (d) using innovation output 
measures at t+2 (rather than at t) as dependent variables to account for the possibility that CDS trading 
may take more than one year to have effects on innovation; (e) excluding firm-years with zero patents 
and citations; (f) excluding self-citations when defining Citation to address the concern that the number 
of citations can be inflated by firms continuously citing their own patents; (g) excluding firms engaging 
in mergers and acquisitions (identified using the Securities Data Company Mergers & Acquisitions 
database) in the previous two years to address the concern that firms may obtain patents through 
takeovers rather than via in-house innovation activities incentivized by CDS trading; (h) excluding the 
period of the technology boom (1998–2000) to address the concern that the presence of highly risky 
new-economy firms drives both innovation output and CDS trade initiation. 
4.3. Tests on endogeneity 
While we have documented a robust positive relation between CDS trading and corporate 
innovation, its causal interpretation remains hypothetical. Apart from the selection issue discussed in 
Section 3.3, our main results are potentially subject to two types of endogeneity. The first type is 
omitted variable bias. Although we have controlled for a standard set of variables in Eq. (2) that 
                                                            
19 In untabulated tests, we use two other matching criteria and obtain similar results. First, when matching each CDS 
firm with a non-CDS firm, we require the difference in the propensity score between the two firms to be less than 0.01, 
which reduces the sample to 12,536 firm-year observations because some CDS firms do not have very close matches. 
Second, we match each CDS firm with two non-CDS firms whose propensity scores are closest to that of the CDS firm. The 
inclusion of additional matching firms increases our sample to 24,954 firm-year observations.  
20 Oehmke and Zawadowski (2017) thoroughly analyze the determinants of CDS trading over the period 2008-2012 
using the CDS data from the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation. They find that hedging motives, speculation motives, 
and the frictions in the underlying bond market are important determinants of CDS positions. In this robustness check, we 
follow Oehmke and Zawadowski (2017) and include in Eq. (1) the amount of bonds outstanding and accounts payable to 
proxy for hedging motives, analyst earnings forecast dispersion to capture speculative trading motives, and bond 
fragmentation and the contractual heterogeneity of corporate bonds to account for trading frictions in the bond market. See 
Oehmke and Zawadowski (2017) for detailed definitions of these variables. In addition to these variables, we also include 
Bank Size (defined in Section 4.3.3) to account for firms’ relationship with large banks. 
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previous studies have shown to affect corporate innovation, the CDS–innovation relation may be 
spurious if our model omits any variables affecting both innovation and the presence of CDSs on a 
firm’s debt. The other plausible endogeneity issue is reverse causality running from corporate 
innovation to CDS trade initiation. To alleviate these endogeneity concerns (i.e., selection bias, omitted 
variables, and reverse causality), our first strategy is to explicitly describe the issues that we can think 
of and design specific tests to address them. In our second strategy, we use the instrumental variable 
approach and a quasi-natural experiment to mitigate any remaining endogeneity concerns. We tabulate 
the results of the endogeneity tests in Table 4. While all control variables in Eq. (2) are still included in 
the new tests, we only report the coefficients of CDS Trading and the newly added variables for the 
sake of brevity.  
4.3.1. Tests on selection issues 
Our matched-sample analysis is designed to address the selection concern that CDS firms are 
different from non-CDS firms in ways that are systematically related to innovation output. To further 
alleviate this concern,  we exclude non-CDS firms and restrict the sample to firm-years that have CDS 
trading (i.e., firm-years for which CDS Trading = 1). Using this subsample, we relate corporate 
innovation to the three CDS liquidity measures defined in Section 3.2 (i.e., Daily Quotes, Distinct 
Dealers, and Distinct Maturities). Saretto and Tookes (2013) argue that more liquid CDS contracts are 
easier and less costly to trade, thereby increasing the likelihood of lenders using CDS contracts as 
hedging instruments. We thus expect the CDS effect on innovation to be stronger when the CDS 
market that references borrowers’ debt is more liquid. Panels A.1–A.3 of Table 4 report the regression 
results obtained by replacing CDS Trading in Eq. (2) with our three CDS liquidity measures. Although 
the sample is reduced to 4,330–4,579 firm-years, the coefficients of the three CDS liquidity measures 
are positive and statistically significant. In terms of economic significance, for example, a one-
standard-deviation rise in Daily Quotes increases Patent (Citation) by 6% (12%). These results not 
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only reveal the positive effect of CDS contract liquidity on corporate innovation but also suggest that 
our main finding is robust to this alternative procedure of controlling for selection bias. 
4.3.2. Tests on omitted variables 
We conduct several tests to tackle the omitted variables problem. First, we augment the baseline 
model by replacing year fixed effects with two pairs of fixed effects, i.e., the location state-by-year and 
industry-by-year fixed effects. We include state-by-year fixed effects to account for unobserved, time-
varying state-level factors, such as the political economy or local business cycles. For instance, prior 
studies (e.g., Amore, Schneider, and Zaldokas, 2013) reveal that the staggered banking deregulation 
across U.S. states affects corporate innovation output by enhancing state-level credit supply. As such, 
deregulation of state-level banking and branching may drive both corporate innovation and the 
demand/supply of CDSs for credit protection. We determine a firm’s location state based on the 
location of its headquarters, which is usually where its major operations are located (Gormley and 
Matsa, 2016). We include industry-by-year fixed effects to control for potential differential trends in 
patenting activities and CDS trading across industries over time. Panel B of Table 4 suggests that our 
main results continue to hold after including both state-by-year and industry-by-year fixed effects. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Second, our key variable of interest, CDS Trading, is constructed using the actual CDS trade 
initiation dates, which exhibit a clustered pattern (Panel A of Appendix A). Thus, the concentration of 
CDS trade initiations around particular time periods could give rise to spurious results. We employ the 
methodology of Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) to address this concern. Specifically, we draw 
782 uniform random numbers and randomly assign one of the actual CDS initiation dates to each of the 
782 CDS firms in our sample. We then re-estimate Eq. (2) using CDS firms and matched non-CDS 
firms with randomly assigned initiation dates and repeat the simulation procedure one thousand times. 
Because the distribution of actual CDS initiation dates is preserved in simulated data, if our main 
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results are driven by event clustering, many replications should yield coefficients close to those 
obtained using the actual initiation dates. The results reported in Panel C of Table 4 indicate that this is 
not the case. Both the mean and the median of the coefficients for CDS Trading, which is constructed 
using randomized CDS initiation dates, are close to zero. The coefficients reported in Table 3 (0.147 
and 0.199) are far out in the right tail of the distribution (i.e., higher than the 99th percentiles), implying 
that assigning the initiation date to the right firm really matters and that our results are not merely a 
statistical artifact reflecting certain time trends or event clustering.21  
Third, there is a significant amount of recent corporate loans that are covenant-light (a.k.a. cov-
lite). Compared with customary loans, cov-lite loans have weaker covenant enforcement, and thus may 
allow borrowing firms to make riskier investment in innovation. Further, Becker and Ivashina (2017) 
suggest that cov-liteness is a  predominant feature of leveraged loans, a risky segment of the syndicated 
loan market primarily involving borrowers of low credit quality. Given that cov-lite loans are widely 
syndicated to banks and institutional investors, such as collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) and loan 
mutual funds, if these investors hedge against credit risks using CDSs, there should be a coincidence 
between the issuance of cov-lite loans and CDS trading at the firm level. Therefore, the issuance of 
cov-lite loans can be an important omitted variable affecting both corporate innovation and CDS trade 
initiation. To address this concern, we collect loan level data from the S&P Leveraged Commentary 
and Data (LCD) database, and classify loans as cov-lite (cov-heavy) if the enforcement of financial 
covenants is incurrence-based (maintenance-based).22 We find that roughly 3% of CDS firms issue 
                                                            
21 The inception year (i.e., 1994) of the CDS market is an important milestone, after which it becomes possible for 
investors to trade credit risk of any company in the CDS market. Thus, one may expect the inception of CDS market in 
1994 to have a general effect on all firms’ innovation. In untabulated tests, we find that it indeed has some positive effects 
on innovation output of debt-dependent companies, but its economic significance is much weaker than those obtained using 
firms’ actual CDS trade initiation dates, confirming that firm-specific CDS initiation dates are highly important in driving 
our results.  
22 Cov-lite loans do not necessarily have fewer covenants than other loans (Becker and Ivashina, 2017). Instead, cov-
lite loans typically involve incurrence provisions that require borrowing firms to comply with financial covenants only 
when they pursue an active event, such as a new debt issuance or a merger. In contrast, cov-heavy loans typically include 
maintenance provisions that require borrowers to maintain compliance at all points in time with contractual financial 
covenants (e.g., the interest coverage ratio). 
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cov-lite loans during our sample period. We conduct three regression analyses and report the results in 
Panel D of Table 4. In Panel D.1, we explicitly control for the effects of cov-lite loans by including a 
binary variable, Cov-Lite, which equals one in and after the first year of a firm borrowing in the cov-
lite loan market, and zero prior to it. In Panel D.2, we augment Eq. (2) by adding two variables, 
Inflow_CLO and Inflow_MF, which account for the exogenous variation in the cov-lite loan market 
arising from net fund inflows to CLOs and loan mutual funds, respectively.23 In Panel D.3, we exclude 
firms with CDS trading initiated after the first quarter of 2005, which corresponds to the start of the 
rapid growth of the cov-lite loan market (Becker and Ivashina, 2017). The coefficients of CDS Trading 
remain positive and significant at the 5% level in all three tests, suggesting that our results are not 
primarily driven by the rise of the cov-lite loan market.  
Finally, in Panel E, we augment Eq. (2) by including a set of additional control variables that 
proxy for corporate governance, which may affect both CDS trade initiation and corporate innovation. 
For instance, on the one hand, prior studies (e.g., Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003) document that poor 
governance mechanisms can increase default risk by aggravating agency costs and information 
asymmetry between a firm and its lenders, thereby increasing the likelihood that lenders use CDSs for 
hedging. On the other hand, Chemmanur and Tian (2016) show that firms shielded with a larger 
number of anti-takeover provisions generate better innovation outcomes because anti-takeover 
provisions alleviate the short-term pressure on managers from the corporate control market. To ensure 
that our findings are not driven by corporate governance, we include the governance index (G-index) 
compiled by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), board size, and institutional ownership as additional 
                                                            
23 Becker and Ivashina (2017) argue that high inflows to CLOs and loan mutual funds predict higher volumes of cov-
lite loans according to the coordination theory. Inflow_CLO and Inflow_MF are aggregate net fund flows collected from the 
LCD and measured at the yearly frequency in billions of U.S. dollars. Because the fund flow data from the LCD are only 
available since 2001, we restrict this analysis to the period 2001-2008.  
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controls. Because of missing values for these additional controls, we perform the analysis with a much 
smaller sample of 5,317 firm-year observations. However, our main results are unaffected.24 
4.3.3. Tests on reverse causality 
The causal relation between corporate innovation and CDS trade initiation can be bidirectional. 
The two directions of causality are not mutually exclusive, and they may be at work simultaneously. 
While our results suggest that CDS trading stimulates borrowing firms’ innovation, innovative 
borrowing firms may be more likely to have CDS trading initiated on their debt for several reasons 
unrelated to the innovation enhancement. First, if lenders observe that borrowing firms have increased 
the level of risky investment in innovation, they may initiate CDS trading to hedge their exposure to 
these borrowers. Second, even if the lending unit of a bank is unable to provide risky loans to firms 
with innovative investment opportunities because of regulatory capital requirements, the bank might be 
large enough to have other units (e.g., a CDS trading desk or a fixed income mutual fund) that are able 
to take on credit risk through CDS trading. Third, borrowing firms’ past innovation success may allow 
them to pledge their patents as collateral and raise more debt financing, thereby increasing lenders’ 
needs to hedge credit risk using CDSs.25  
We conduct three tests to alleviate these reverse causality concern, respectively. First, we 
examine the dynamics of innovation differentials between CDS and non-CDS firms over the years 
surrounding CDS trade initiation. If reverse causality drives our results, we should observe increases in 
innovation output prior to CDS trade initiation. To detect this possibility, we use the method of 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and replace CDS Trading in Eq. (2) with five year-indicators, 
namely, Year-2, Year-1, Year0, Year+1, and Year≥+2. Yearj equals one in the jth year relative to the year of 
                                                            
24 In untabulated tests, we also find that the results are robust to controlling for alternative proxies for corporate 
governance (e.g., the percentage of independent directors), a proxy for management quality (Milbourn, 2003) defined as 
abnormal stock returns (CAPM adjusted) accumulated over the period [t-3, t-1], and the measures of financial constraints 
(e.g., Kaplan and Zingales’ (1997) or Whited and Wu’s (2006) indices). 
25 Mann (2016) reports that, in 2013, 40% of patenting firms in the U.S. have pledged their patents as collateral at some 
point. Furthermore, he shows that patenting companies issue more debt when creditor rights to patents are strengthened. 
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CDS trade initiation and zero otherwise. Year≥+2 captures the CDS effects from the second year after 
CDS trade initiation onward. The results presented in Panel F of Table 4 show that the Year-2, Year-1, 
and Year0 coefficients are largely insignificant, suggesting that, compared with the matched non-CDS 
firms, CDS firms do not have greater innovation output before and during the year of CDS trade 
initiation. To a large extent, this finding ameliorates the reverse causality concern. Furthermore, the 
Year+1 and Year≥+2 coefficients are positive and significant (t-statistics ranging from 2.3 to 3.1), 
indicating that the innovation differentials appear only after CDS trading initiation. Interestingly, the 
Year≥+2 coefficients (0.225 and 0.230) are larger than those of Year+1 (0.087 and 0.134), indicating that 
while the CDS effect on innovation manifests quickly (i.e., one year after CDS trade initiation), it 
subsequently becomes stronger. This result is also consistent with the patterns in Figure 2.  
Second, to mitigate the concern that innovative firms’ relationship with large banks triggers CDS 
trading on their debt, we include Bank Size as an additional control variable in Eq. (2). Bank Size is 
defined as the natural logarithm of bank lenders’ average total assets, which are obtained from 
Compustat Bank. The number of observations is reduced to 4,377 if we focus on firms with bank 
lenders that are covered by Compustat Bank. However, the results reported in Panel G of Table 4 show 
that the coefficients of CDS Trading remain positive and significant. Similar results (untabulated) are 
obtained if we estimate the regressions using the whole sample and set Bank Size to zero for firms 
having zero bank debt or having bank lenders not covered by Compustat Bank. 
Third, we incorporate several additional variables into Eq. (2) to explicitly account for reverse 
causality arising from borrowing firms’ past innovation investments, past innovation success, and 
perceived risk profiles, which may increase lenders’ hedging needs using CDSs. Specifically, we 
measure past innovation investments (past innovation success) as the rolling average R&D/Assets (the 
number of patents or citations) from year t-2 to t-6. Moreover, we use forward-looking implied 
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volatility to capture borrowing firms’ risks perceived by CDS market participants. 26  The results, 
reported in Panel H of Table 4, reveal that the CDS Trading coefficients remain positive and significant, 
substantiating causality running from CDS trading to innovation. 
4.3.4. The instrumental variable approach and the quasi-natural experiment 
To further alleviate endogeneity concerns, especially those not previously identified, we employ 
an instrumental variable approach similar to that of Saretto and Tookes (2013). Specifically, we 
employ lenders’ hedging activities on foreign exchange (Lender FX Hedging) as an instrumental 
variable for CDS trading. Minton, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) find that banks that hedge tend to 
hedge more than one component of their portfolios. In particular, they show that banks that hedge their 
currency risk using foreign exchange derivatives tend to also hedge their credit risk using CDSs. Thus, 
from a relevance perspective, lending banks’ foreign exchange hedging activities should be positively 
correlated with their hedging demand for CDSs and the likelihood of CDS contracts being initiated on 
their borrowers. Furthermore, this instrument is likely to meet exclusion criteria because lenders’ 
foreign exchange derivatives position is a macro hedge rather than a firm-level hedge. Lenders’ foreign 
exchange hedging should not directly drive borrowing firms’ innovation output. We define Lender FX 
Hedging as the average notional volume of foreign exchange derivatives used for hedging purposes 
relative to the bank’s total assets across all the banks that have served either as lenders or bond 
underwriters for the firm over the previous five years.27 
We then implement the instrumental variable analysis using Wooldridge’s (2002) three-stage 
procedure. In the first stage, we estimate the probit model in Eq. (1) with Lender FX Hedging as the 
instrument, and compute the fitted probability of CDS trade initiation. In the second stage, we regress 
                                                            
26 Hilscher, Pollet, and Wilson (2015) show that information in equity markets leads information in CDS markets; thus 
forward-looking implied volatility, which is estimated using stock and option prices, should help gauge investors’ risk 
perceptions in CDS markets. 
27 We identity firms’ lenders using the DealScan syndicated loan database. Bond underwriters are identified using the 
Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). We then extract the foreign exchange derivative positions of the lenders 
and bond underwriters from Federal Reserve call report data.  
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CDS Trading on the fitted probability of CDS trade initiation and all the control variables in Eq. (2). In 
the third stage, we regress Ln(1+Innovation) on all the control variables in Eq. (2) and the fitted value 
of CDS Trading obtained in the second stage.28 The first-stage regression (untabulated) shows that 
Lender FX Hedging positively and significantly predicts CDS Trading (t-statistic = 2.1), suggesting 
that the instrument meets the relevance criteria econometrically. The weak instrument test (untabulated) 
generates a p-value of less than 0.01, thus rejecting the weak instrument hypothesis. The results of the 
third-stage regression are presented in Panel I of Table 4. The results show that the coefficients of fitted 
CDS Trading are positive and statistically significant at conventional levels in both patent and citation 
regressions. Similar results (untabulated) are obtained if we control for Bank Size in the regressions.  
Finally, we use the staggered enactment of state anti-recharacterization laws as a quasi-natural 
experiment. The laws allow borrowers to transfer collateral to a bankruptcy-remote special-purpose 
entity so that lenders are not subject to the automatic stay (Mann, 2016), thereby simplifying lenders’ 
claiming process and strengthening their rights and control over collateral.29 Given that patents are 
often used as collateral in the debt market, the passage of these laws improves borrowing firms’ ability 
to finance innovation with debt (Mann, 2016; Chava, Nanda, and Xiao, 2017). If the positive effect of 
CDSs on innovation works through improving the compatibility between debt financing and innovation, 
the effect should be weaker after the enactment of anti-recharacterization laws by states. To test this 
implication, we construct an indicator variable (Post AR), which equals one after the enactment of anti-
recharacterization laws in the state of a firm’s headquarter or incorporation, and zero otherwise.30 We 
then augment Eq. (2) by including Post AR and its interaction with CDS Trading, and report the 
regression results in Panel J of Table 4. We find that the coefficients of CDS Trading×Post AR are 
                                                            
28 An important advantage of this three-stage procedure is that it takes into account the binary nature of the endogenous 
variable. Moreover, the procedure does not require the binary model in the first stage to be correctly specified. Wooldridge 
(2002) shows that the procedure provides efficient estimations under fairly general conditions. 
29 The automatic stay restricts lenders’ collection efforts related to collateral seizure. It is automatically imposed when a 
borrowing firm files for bankruptcy under Chapter 11.  
30 According to Mann (2016), the states that enacted the anti-recharacterization law include Texas and Louisiana in 
1997, Alabama and Delaware in 2001, South Dakota in 2003, Virginia in 2004, and Nevada in 2005. 
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negative and significant, confirming that the beneficial effect of CDSs on innovation is reduced after a 
positive exogenous shock to creditor rights.  
To summarize, while endogeneity is a perennial issue that no empirical test can entirely rule out, 
we conduct a battery of tests to alleviate the endogeneity concerns and find that our main conclusion 
holds. Although each test can be subject to criticism, the balance of evidence points to a causal relation 
running from CDS trading to corporate innovation.  
5. Additional Analysis 
Our baseline results imply a positive and causal relation between CDS trading and corporate 
innovation. In this section, we conduct a number of tests to probe the channels through which CDS 
trading enhances borrowing firms’ innovation output. If the risk-taking channel plays an important role 
in shaping the positive CDS–innovation relation, the effect of CDS trading on innovation should be 
more pronounced for firms in which debt financing is less compatible with borrowing firms’ risk 
taking in innovation. Furthermore, after the advent of CDS trading, borrowing firms’ innovation efforts 
should be directed toward more risky, novel, and impactful innovation projects. We also use several 
tests to examine the possibility that CDS trading promotes innovation by alleviating borrowing firms’ 
financing constraints and allowing more innovative projects to be financed by new debt issuance. 
Finally, we examine the effect of CDS trading on the efficiency of corporate innovation to reconcile 
our findings that CDS trading improves innovation output but does not have a significant impact on 
innovation input in terms of R&D. We further investigate whether patents generated after CDS trading 
are of greater importance or have higher economic value, apart from having higher scientific value in 
terms of citations.  
5.1. Cross-sectional heterogeneity in results 
To investigate how our results vary across firms, we use variables one year prior to CDS trade 
initiation to partition our sample of CDS and non-CDS firm-years in several ways. We report the 
 32 
 
results in Table 5, where the regressions include all the control variables in Table 3. Again, to be 
concise, we only tabulate the coefficients of CDS Trading for different subsamples. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
We first examine how borrowing firms’ dependence on debt financing affects our results. To the 
extent that CDSs alleviate compatibility issues between debt financing and innovation, we expect the 
CDS effect on innovation to be stronger for firms that are more dependent on debt financing for 
investment. We divide the sample into two groups according to the sample median level of debt 
dependence. Debt dependence is measured using the industry median fraction of investment financed 
with debt, i.e., the sum of net debt issued divided by the sum of capital expenditures and R&D 
expenses over the past decade (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1998). We then separately re-estimate Eq. (2) 
for the two subsamples with high and low debt dependence. The results presented in Panel A of Table 
5 show that the CDS effect on innovation output is more pronounced for firms with higher debt 
dependence, confirming that the presence of CDSs alleviates compatibility issues between debt 
financing and innovation. Among firms with lower debt dependence, the CDS Trading coefficients are 
not significantly different from zero and are much smaller in magnitude. 
Furthermore, the risk-taking channel suggests that CDS trading fosters corporate innovation by 
weakening lenders’ incentives to engage in continuous monitoring. We thus expect that the effect of 
CDS trading is more prominent when the lender–borrower relationship is characterized by continuous 
monitoring prior to CDS trade initiation. To test this prediction, we partition the firms into two groups 
according to whether they have bank debt before the advent of CDS trading. To the extent that banks 
are likely to continuously monitor borrowing firms more than public debtholders (e.g., Atanassov, 
2015), the CDS effect should be more evident for firms with bank debt. We then separately re-estimate 
Eq. (2) for the two groups and report the results in Panel B of Table 5. 31  Consistent with our 
                                                            
31 For this analysis, we exclude 3,744 firm-years that do not exist in S&P Capital IQ. In an untabulated test, we treat 
these firm-years as having zero bank debt and find that our results are qualitatively the same.  
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expectations, the CDS Trading coefficients are positive and significant mainly for firms with bank debt, 
suggesting that CDSs are more effective in promoting innovation for firms financed with debt that is 
less compatible with innovation.  
We also examine how the CDS–innovation relation is moderated by the number of bank lenders. 
Firms borrowing from fewer banks are more likely to be continuously monitored by banks because the 
borrower–lender relationship is strengthened as the number of lenders decreases (Carvalho, Ferreira, 
and Matos, 2015).32 Hence, we expect the CDS effect on corporate innovation to be stronger for firms 
with fewer bank lenders. We split the subsample with bank debt into two groups based on the median 
number of unique bank lenders over the five years prior to CDS trade initiation.33 The regression 
results tabulated in Panel C of Table 5 are consistent with our expectations.  
As discussed in Section 1, the risk-taking channel also implies that CDSs foster corporate 
innovation by loosening debt covenants. Debt covenants are important vehicles through which lenders 
can exert control rights and monitor borrowing firms. In the presence of stringent covenants, borrowing 
firms may curb risk taking in innovation to avoid covenant violations. To the extent that firms’ debt 
covenants are loosened after CDS trading starts (Shan, Tang, and Winton, 2015), their ability and 
flexibility to experiment with novel projects should increase (Atanassov, 2015). Against this backdrop, 
we expect the CDS effect on innovation to be stronger for firms with more debt covenants that are 
loosened after the introduction of CDSs. To test this prediction, we focus on the subsample with bank 
loans and collect covenant information from the Loan Pricing Corporation’s DealScan database. 
Specifically, we are interested in two types of loan covenants, i.e., secured debt and net worth 
covenants, which have been shown by Shan, Tang, and Winton (2015) to loosen upon the inception of 
                                                            
32  Additionally, Diamond (1984) argues that delegating monitoring to fewer lenders can enhance monitoring by 
mitigating the duplication of monitoring efforts, coordination failure, and free-rider problems associated with multiple 
lenders.  
33 Bank lenders are identified using the Loan Pricing Corporation’s DealScan database. For each firm in a given year, 
we examine the prior five-year period for any syndicated loan facilities in place for this firm. Summing all such active 
facilities, we compute the number of unique banks that lend to the firm. 
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the CDS market.34 Firms with bank debt are then divided into two groups according to whether their 
loan contracts contain at least one of the two types of covenants over the five years before CDS trading 
starts. We re-estimate Eq. (2) for the two groups and report the regression results in Panel D of Table 5, 
which show that the CDS effect on innovation is more positive and significant for firms with loan 
covenants that are loosened after CDS trade initiation, consistent with the risk-taking channel.  
Finally, we partition the sample according to the borrowing firms’ probability of debt 
renegotiation with lenders. As discussed in Section 1, anticipating that CDS-insured lenders can be 
tough in debt renegotiation and force borrowing firms into inefficient bankruptcy, borrowing firms may 
take less risk in innovation to avoid corporate defaults that trigger debt renegotiation. We thus expect 
that the risk-taking effect of CDS trading on innovation is stronger for borrowing firms that are less 
likely to renegotiate their debt. We measure the probability of debt renegotiation using the average 
Altman’s (1968) Z-score in the past two years and divide the sample into two groups according to its 
median value.35 A higher Z-score indicates a lower probability of default, thereby implying a lower 
probability of debt renegotiation. We then separately re-estimate Eq. (2) for the two groups and present 
the results in Panel E of Table 5. We find that the CDS Trading coefficients are positive and significant 
for firms that are less likely to renegotiate their debt, whereas the coefficients are smaller and 
statistically insignificant for firms with high probabilities of debt renegotiation. These results are 
consistent with the view that the ex post threat of exacting CDS-protected creditors weakens borrowing 
firms’ ex ante risk-taking incentives that arise from decreased creditor monitoring. Collectively, our 
cross-sectional analysis in Table 5 supports our arguments that CDS trading fosters corporate 
innovation by promoting borrowing firms’ risk taking in innovation and enhancing the compatibility 
between debt financing and innovation. 
                                                            
34 Specifically, the secured debt covenant requires that the borrowing firm protect the loan with a collateral asset that is 
at least of the same value as the face value of the loan. The net worth covenant requires that the borrowing firm maintain a 
minimum (tangible) net worth value during the life of the loan.  
35  Altman’s (1968) Z-score is defined as (3.3×Pretax Income+Sales+1.4×Retained Earnings+1.2×[Current Assets-
Current Liabilities])/Assets. The results (untabulated) are similar if we alternatively use Z-score at t-1 or the average Z-score 
in the past three years to measure the probability of debt renegotiation.  
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5.2. CDS trading and innovation strategies 
Corporate innovation strategies are highly heterogeneous across firms and vary drastically over 
time (e.g., Hall, 1993). The risk-taking channel suggests that CDS trading enables borrowing firms to 
achieve greater flexibility and tolerance to risky experimentation. We thus expect borrowing firms to 
shift the trajectory of innovation from low-risk and incremental innovations to high-risk and radical 
innovations after CDS trade initiation. To test this, we define several measures of innovation strategies.  
First, we follow prior studies (e.g., Balsmeier, Fleming, and Manso, 2017) and categorize 
innovation strategies as exploitative or exploratory strategies. Exploitative innovations refine and 
extend existing knowledge and have less risky payoffs and shorter gestation periods. By contrast, 
exploratory innovations require new knowledge or a departure from existing knowledge, and their 
payoffs are riskier and take a longer time to realize. We construct proxies for exploitative and 
exploratory innovations using the extent to which a firm’s patents rely on existing versus new 
knowledge. Specifically, a firm’s existing knowledge includes its existing patents and the patents that 
its existing patents cite. We categorize a patent as exploitative if at least 60% of its citations are based 
on the firm’s existing knowledge and as exploratory if at least 60% of its citations are based on new 
knowledge (i.e., patents not in the firm’s existing knowledge). We then define %Exploitative 
(%Exploratory) as the number of exploitative (exploratory) patents divided by the total number of 
patents that each firm applies for each year.  
Second, we separate innovations into product and process innovations. According to Chava et al. 
(2013), product innovations result in the creation of new products and are thus more radical and risky 
than process innovations, which mainly involve enhancing the efficiency of existing production 
processes. We follow Chava et al. (2013) and classify patents as process patents if they fall into the 
International Patent Classification (IPC) category B01, which  primarily focuses on Physical and 
Chemical Processes, and define all other patents as product patents. We then define Process (Product) 
 36 
 
as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of process (product) patents that each firm applies for 
each year.  
Third, we construct a measure of originality of the patents filed by firms. Patent originality 
reflects how far a patent is away from the extant technology class, thus indicating the impact of 
innovation. Hall, Jaffee, and Trajtenberg (2001) argue that original patents cite previous patents that 
belong to a wide range of technological fields. We use their definition and compute the originality 
score of a patent as one minus the Herfindahl index of the three-digit technology class distribution of 
all the patents that the patent cites. A higher score corresponds to a higher level of originality for 
patents. We then define Originality as the mean originality score of a firm’s new patents in each year.  
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
Table 6 reports the results obtained by re-estimating Eq. (2) with the dependent 
variables %Exploitative, %Exploratory, Process, Product, and Originality. The CDS Trading 
coefficients suggest that after CDS trade initiation, CDS firms, compared with non-CDS firms, 
significantly decrease the fraction of exploitative patents but increase the fraction of exploratory 
patents (columns (1) and (2)), create more product patents rather than process patents (columns (3) and 
(4)), and enhance the patent originality (column (5)). To the extent that exploratory and product patents 
are more risky and radical than exploitative and process patents and that patents with higher originality 
scores represent more impactful inventions, our findings indicate that after CDS trade initiation, firms 
shift away from low-risk and incremental innovations to high-risk and path-breaking innovations.  
5.3. Tests of the financing channel 
Prior studies suggest that the presence of CDS trading increases borrowing firms’ debt capacities 
(Bolton and Oehmke, 2011) and relaxes their credit constraints (Saretto and Tookes, 2013). Firms with 
traded CDSs possibly issue more debt and use the proceeds to increase innovation input (i.e., R&D 
investments), giving rise to greater innovation output. In other words, CDSs may promote corporate 
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innovation through a financing channel. This financing channel has at least three implications. First, the 
CDS effect on innovation should be stronger for more financially constrained firms than for less 
constrained firms because more constrained firms should benefit more from the relaxation of credit 
constraints after CDS trade initiation. Second, the CDS effect on innovation should be more 
pronounced for firms where debtholders are less willing to finance innovation investments because of 
their conflicts with shareholders. Third, compared with non-CDS firms, CDS firms should increase 
R&D investments more after the inception of CDS trading. We use several tests to examine whether 
any of these implications of the financing channel are supported empirically. The results are reported in 
Table 7. 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
In Panel A of Table 7, we partition our sample using financial constraints measures and 
separately estimate the CDS effect on innovation for more and less financially constrained firms. 
Specifically, our classification schemes are based on firm size (Ln(Assets)), the dividend payer 
indicator, and Whited and Wu’s (2006) financial constraints index (the WW index).36 A firm is defined 
as more (less) financially constrained if its size is smaller (larger) than the sample median, if it pays 
zero (non-zero) dividends, or if its WW index is above (below) the sample median. The regression 
results reveal that the CDS Trading coefficients are larger and more significant for less financially 
constrained firms than for more constrained firms. This finding runs counter to the first implication of 
the financing channel, indicating that our main results are not driven by CDSs relaxing borrowing firms’ 
financial constraints and increasing their debt financing. Similar inferences can be drawn if we partition 
the sample using alternative financial constraints classifications, such as credit ratings (e.g., Almeida, 
                                                            
36  The WW index is equal to -0.091×Cash Flow/Assets-0.062×Dividend Payer Indicator+0.021×Long-term 
Debt/Assets-0.044×Ln(Assets)+0.102×Industry Median Sales Growth-0.035×Sales Growth. By construction, higher scores 
of the WW index indicate that firms are more financially constrained. Similar to the tests in Section 5.1, we partition the 
sample using financial constraints variables one year prior to CDS trade initiation. 
 38 
 
Campello, and Weisbach, 2004) and the financial constraints indices suggested by Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997), Cleary (1999), and Hadlock and Pierce (2010).37 
In Panel B, we partition the sample according to the median value of institutional ownership 
defined as the fraction of shares outstanding held by institutional investors from Thomson 13f. 
Colonnello, Efing, and Zucchi (2016) argue that institutional investors have stronger bargaining power 
than retail investors in debt renegotiation, thereby exacerbating the conflicts between shareholders and 
debtholders. They show that debtholders of firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to 
buy CDS protections. Thus, if CDSs enhance corporate innovation through encouraging debtholders to 
finance more innovation investments, the CDS effect on innovation should be stronger for firms with 
higher institutional ownership. We then estimate Eq. (2) separately for firms with high and low 
institutional ownership, which reflect strong and weak debtholder-shareholder conflicts, respectively. 
However, we do not find a stronger CDS effect on innovation for firms with higher institutional 
ownership.38  
In Panel C, we examine the effect of CDS trading on firms’ R&D investments by re-estimating 
Eq. (2) with the dependent variable (R&D/Assets)t. The results show that regardless of whether we 
control for lagged R&D in the regression, the CDS Trading coefficients are not significantly different 
from zero, indicating that compared with non-CDS firms, CDS firms experience no significant 
increases in R&D expenditures after the advent of CDS trading. This finding suggests that our main 
results are not driven by an increase in innovation input financed with new debt issuances after the 
                                                            
37 Specifically, in untabulated tests, we find that the coefficients of CDS Trading are significantly positive only for less 
financially constrained firms when the sample is bifurcated using credit ratings or the financial constraints indices of Kaplan 
and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999). When we partition the sample using Hadlock and Pierce’s (2010) index, which is 
defined as -0.737×Ln(Assets)+0.043×Ln(Assets)2-0.04×Firm Age, we find that the CDS Trading coefficients for both more 
and less constrained firms are significantly positive.  
38  Apart from institutional ownership, Colonnello, Efing, and Zucchi (2016) use three additional measures of 
shareholder bargaining power, i.e., ownership concentration among the top five institutional investors, active ownership 
defined as the fraction of shares held by investors that each allocate at least 2% of their portfolio wealth to the firm, and the 
ratio of bank debt to total assets, a lower value of which indicates a stronger shareholder bargaining power. Our results 
reported in Panel B of Table 5 suggest that the CDS effect is not stronger for firms with no bank debt. Further analysis 
(untabulated) using top five institutional ownership and active ownership generates qualitatively similar findings.  
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inception of CDS trading. However, if CDS firms borrow more (Saretto and Tookes, 2013) but do not 
allocate the proceeds of new debt issues to R&D investment, where do the proceeds go? To address 
this question, in untabulated tests, we investigate whether CDS firms allocate new debt proceeds for 
alternative uses, which include capital expenditures, acquisitions, dividends, and cash holdings, by 
using each alternative use (deflated by total assets) as the dependent variable in Eq. (2). We find that 
the CDS Trading coefficient is positive and statistically significant in the cash holdings regression, 
consistent with Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang’s (2017) finding that CDS-referenced firms hold 
more cash after CDS trading begins on their debt. However, we detect no significant CDS effects on 
capital expenditures, acquisitions, and dividends after CDS trade initiation. In sum, although CDS 
trading increases the credit supply for borrowing firms, the additional funding seems to be used to 
build up cash reserves rather than to finance R&D spending or other investments. Overall, the evidence 
in Table 7 does not support the alternative explanation that the CDS effect on innovation output works 
through the financing channel.  
5.4. CDS trading, innovation efficiency, and the economic value of patents  
Our analysis has shown thus far that CDS trading leads to greater innovation output (i.e., patents 
and citations) but does not significantly increase innovation input (i.e., R&D spending). This implies 
that CDS trading engenders greater innovation output by enhancing innovation efficiency, which 
captures a firm’s ability to generate patents and patent citations per dollar of R&D investment. To 
confirm the implication, we follow Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013) and construct innovation efficiency 
measures as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents and citations over the average 
R&D expenditures in the past five years (Ln(1+Patent/R&D) and Ln(1+Citation/R&D)). We then re-
estimate Eq. (2) using the two innovation efficiency measures as dependent variables.39 The results 
reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 show that the CDS Trading coefficients are positive and 
                                                            
39 For these regressions, the number of observations is reduced to 9,507 because the innovation efficiency measures 
cannot be defined for firms with missing or zero R&D investments.  
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significant at the 5% level. This finding suggests that CDS trading enhances innovation output by more 
efficiently deploying R&D investments toward more innovative projects rather than increasing R&D 
investments per se. 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
Finally, we examine the effect of CDS trading on three additional quality measures of corporate 
innovation. Firms face a trade-off between patenting their innovation and keeping it secret. While 
patenting innovation can protect innovators’ intellectual property, the information disclosure through 
patenting may enable competitors to obtain certain technological knowledge (Saidi and Zaldokas, 
2017). It is possible that after CDS trade initiation, firms become more willing to patent their 
innovation, instead of becoming more innovative. To wit, CDS trading may increase firms’ propensity 
to patent without increasing the amount and quality of innovation.  
To alleviate this concern, we first use the number of citations per patent (Citationതതതതതതതതതത) to measure the 
average importance or quality of patents. The second measure is the number of citation-weighted 
patents (CW_Patent) used by Chava et al. (2013). Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) show that 
citation-weighted patents are much more correlated with firm value than simple patent counts. The 
third measure is Kogan et al.’s (2017) economic value of patents (Patent Value), which is defined as 
the present value of the monopoly rents associated with patents. Forward citations, which have been 
used as one of our primary innovation output measures, mainly capture the scientific value of patents. 
Kogan et al. (2017) note that, while the economic and scientific values of patents are strongly and 
positively correlated, the two values do not necessarily coincide with one another. For example, a 
patent that makes a scientific breakthrough may not be very effective in stifling competition and thus 
may only generate small monopoly rents. Kogan et al.’s (2017) measure is computed based on stock 
market reactions to the announcement of patents that the USPTO grants to public firms.40 Specifically, 
they separate the component of a firm’s stock return that is related to patent values from those that are 
                                                            
40 We download data on the economic value of patents from Dimitris Papanikolaou’s website. 
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unrelated to patent values and then compute a patent’s economic value as the increase in the firm’s 
market valuation in the three-day period of patent grant announcements after adjusting for the market 
return, the success rate of the patent application, and the component of the idiosyncratic return 
unrelated to the patent. For firms with more than one patent in a fiscal year, we compute the total 
economic value of all patents filed that year.  
We log-transform the three measures and use them as the dependent variables in Eq. (2). The 
regression results reported in columns (3)-(5) of Table 8 show that the CDS Trading coefficients are 
positive and significant at the 5% level. In terms of economic significance, the annual increases in the 
number of citations per patent, the number of citation-weighted patents, and the economic value of 
patents for CDS firms are, 13.3%, 14.8%, and 8.1% higher than those for non-CDS firms after CDS 
trade initiation, respectively. Collectively, these results imply that CDSs enable borrowing firms to 
generate both scientifically and economically more valuable patents. While our tests in Table 8 can 
mitigate the concern that CDS introduction increases firms’ propensity to patent without enhancing 
their innovation, they cannot completely address the issue.41 In particular, they cannot rule out the 
possibility that while the overall amount of innovation remains the same, firms shift their patenting 
strategy from patenting less important innovations to more important ones because, for example, firms 
may have fewer secrecy concerns after CDS trade initiation. This challenge is difficult to overcome 
because empirical researchers can only observe a firm’s patents, rather than its total innovation that 
includes both patents and unpatented innovations. Thus, we highlight the issue as an important topic 
for future research, particularly if unpatented innovations become measurable.  
6. Conclusion 
                                                            
41 Specifically, our tests can rule out the possibility that after CDS introduction, firms, instead of increasing the overall 
amount of innovation, just patent more economically unimportant innovations, or patent more innovations of the same 
importance (e.g., the same number of citations per patent) as before. 
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We study the link between CDSs and companies’ technological innovation. On the one hand, as 
an important innovation in global financial markets in recent decades, CDSs have come under harsh 
criticism since the financial crisis of 2007–2009. While some have debated whether CDSs contributed 
to the crisis and how CDS markets should be regulated, little is known about whether CDSs have any 
real effects on the economy. On the other hand, technological innovation  has become a core strategy to 
enhance firms’ competitiveness and long-term growth in the new millennium.  Despite the abundant 
literature on various factors that spur or impede corporate innovation, few studies examine the role of 
CDS trading in affecting technological innovation. Our paper fills these gaps.  
Using a large sample of U.S. listed firms, we show that CDS trade initiation significantly 
increases reference firms’ innovation output measured by patents and citations. These results are robust 
to a variety of tests on model specifications, variable definitions, and selection and endogeneity issues. 
We also find that CDSs shift borrowing firms away from low-risk and incremental innovations to high-
risk, radical, and economically more valuable innovations. Additional analysis reveals that CDSs 
mainly spur corporate innovation by enhancing lenders’ risk tolerance and encouraging borrowing 
firms’ risk taking in innovation rather than by increasing borrowing firms’ R&D investments.  
Finally, we stress two limitations of our study. First, since most CDS firms in our sample are 
large and mature firms, our results should be generalized with caution, especially to small and start-up 
firms. Second, although our findings suggest a “bright” side of CDSs in terms of stimulating corporate 
innovation, we do not conclude that CDSs have a positive aggregate welfare effect. Similar to other 
financial innovations, CDSs are a double-edged sword capable of producing both positive and negative 
outcomes. Prior research has documented various effects of CDSs on risk sharing, market completeness, 
credit supply, financing costs, accounting conservatism, corporate cash holdings, bankruptcy risk, and 
corporate governance, among others (Augustin et al., 2016). We add to the literature by showing that 
CDSs promote borrowing firms’ risk taking, leading to greater innovation output. However, the risk-
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taking effect may induce moral hazard problems in borrowing firms and encourage them to take 
excessive risks in value-decreasing investment projects. Meanwhile, the discipline imposed by the 
threat of tough lenders in debt renegotiations may curb moral hazard and excessive risk taking. Thus, to 
better understand the aggregate welfare effect of CDSs, one needs to conduct a thorough investigation 
into these possible scenarios and consider various financial and real effects of CDSs, which we leave to 
future research.42 At a minimum, our findings highlight that regulators need to determine how CDS 
markets should be regulated based on the trade-off between the various benefits and costs of CDSs. 
                                                            
42 Danis and Gamba (2016) take an important step toward addressing this issue by documenting the positive effect of 
CDSs on reference firms’ value. In particular, they find that, on average, the reference firms’ value increases by 2.9% with 
the introduction of a CDS market.  
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Appendix A. Distribution of CDS firms over time and across industries 
The sample consists of firms jointly covered in the CreditTrade, the GFI Group and Markit CDS databases, 
CRSP, and the USPTO patent and citation database between 1997 and 2008. The CDS initiation year is defined 
as the first year in which a firm has CDSs traded on its debt. Panel A reports the distribution of CDS firms by 
initiation year. Panel B reports the distribution of CDS firms by one-digit SIC industry.   
 
Panel A: Distribution of CDS firms by initiation year 
 (1) (2) 
Year Number of new CDS firms Percentage of all CDS firms 
1997 21 2.7% 
1998 41 5.2% 
1999 35 4.5% 
2000 77 9.8% 
2001 207 26.5% 
2002 124 15.9% 
2003 94 12.0% 
2004 80 10.2% 
2005 38 4.9% 
2006 31 4.0% 
2007 26 3.3% 
2008 8 1.0% 
Total 782 100% 
 
Panel B: Distribution of CDS firms by one-digit SIC industry 
    (1) (2) 
SIC 
code Included industries 
Number of CDS 
firms 
Percentage of all 
CDS firms 
1 Mining and construction 82 10.5% 
2 
Food, tobacco, textile mill, apparel, and lumber and wood 
products, furniture and fixtures, paper, printing, publishing, 
and chemical products, petroleum refining, etc. 
208 26.6% 
3 
Rubber and plastic products, leather, stone, clay, glass, 
concrete, and metal products, machinery, electronic and 
electrical equipment, transportation equipment, measuring, 
analyzing, and controlling instruments, etc. 
213 27.2% 
4 Transportation, communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services 99 12.7% 
5 Retail and wholesale trade 78 10.0% 
7 
Hotels, personal and business services, automotive repair 
services, motion pictures, amusement and recreation 
services, etc. 
80 10.2% 
8 
Health, legal, educational, and social services, museums, art 
galleries, botanical and zoological gardens, membership 
organizations, engineering, accounting, research, and 
management services, private households, etc. 
22 2.8% 
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Appendix B. Robustness checks 
The sample consists of CDS firms that initiated CDS trading between 1997 and 2008 and the matched non-
CDS firms. CDS Trading is equal to one in and after the first year of CDS trading on a reference firm and zero 
prior to it. All regressions include the same control variables as those in Table 3, but their coefficients are not 
tabulated. Detailed variable definitions are in the legend of Table 3. The t- or z-statistics in parentheses are 
calculated from the Huber/White/Sandwich heteroskedastic-consistent errors, which are also corrected for 
correlation across observations for a given firm. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Matching within the same industry (N = 16,636) 
 Ln(1+Patent)t Ln(1+Citation)t 
CDS Trading 0.139*** 0.166** 
 (2.6) (2.3) 
   
Panel B: Including additional variables identified by Oehmke and Zawadowski (2017) and Bank Size in 
Eq. (1) to construct the matched sample (N = 5,045) 
 Ln(1+Patent)t Ln(1+Citation)t 
CDS Trading 0.201*** 0.298*** 
 (2.8) (2.8) 
   
Panel C: Negative binomial regressions (N = 16,636) 
 Patentt Citationt 
CDS Trading 0.176** 0.535*** 
 (2.5) (3.0) 
   
Panel D: Using corporate innovation output measured at t+2 (N = 13,543) 
 Ln(1+Patent)t+2 Ln(1+Citation)t+2 
CDS Trading 0.233*** 0.204** 
 (2.8) (2.1) 
   
Panel E: Excluding firm-years with zero patents or citations (Npatent = 7,501; Ncitation = 5,710) 
 Ln(1+Patent)t Ln(1+Citation)t 
CDS Trading 0.207*** 0.244*** 
 (3.3) (3.6) 
   
Panel F: Excluding self-citations (N = 16,636) 
  Ln(1+Citation)t 
CDS Trading  0.174*** 
  (2.6) 
   
Panel G: Excluding firms engaging in M&A transactions in the previous two years (N = 13,320) 
 Ln(1+Patent)t Ln(1+Citation)t 
CDS Trading 0.169*** 0.249*** 
 (2.7) (3.2) 
 
Panel H: Excluding the tech bubble period (1998–2000) (N = 12,647) 
 Ln(1+Patent)t Ln(1+Citation)t 
CDS Trading 0.171*** 0.237*** 
 (2.9) (3.2) 
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 Fig. 1. Lenders’ net payoff with and without CDS protection. The figure shows lenders’ net payoffs with and 
without CDS protection. The horizontal axis denotes the value of borrowing firms’ assets and the vertical axis 
denotes lenders’ net payoff. The dashed (solid) line indicates lenders’ net payoffs with (without) the CDS 
protection. With CDS protection, lenders’ net payoff is the face value of debt minus CDS premiums, which 
increases with borrowing firms’ default risk. 
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Panel A: Average changes in the number of patents around CDS trading initiation 
  
Panel B: Average changes in the number of citations around CDS trading initiation 
 Fig. 2. Changes in innovation output around CDS trade initiation. The sample consists of CDS firms 
that initiated CDS trading between 1997 and 2008 and the matched non-CDS firms jointly. The 
matched non-CDS firms is selected based on the nearest one propensity score matching method, which 
is estimated using the probit model reported in Panel A of Table 1. Patent is the number of patents 
applied for, during the current year, which are eventually granted. Citation is the total number of 
citations arising from patents. The citations are adjusted using the time-technology class fixed effects. 
Panel A (B) plots the average changes in the number of patents (citations) around CDS trade initiation 
for CDS firms and the matched non-CDS firms separately. For CDS firms, the year of CDS trade 
initiation is denoted as event year 0. The changes in innovation output are computed from one year 
before CDS trade initiation (i.e., year -1) to t years (t = 1, 2, and 3) after CDS trade initiation. The event 
years of non-CDS firms are defined according to their CDS counterparts. 
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Table 1 
The probability of CDS trade initiation and the matched sample. 
The sample includes our CDS firms and all non-CDS firms that are in Compustat during the period 
1997–2008 and have non-missing values for the variables used in the model. Panel A reports the 
coefficient estimates obtained from estimating a probit model predicting the probability of CDS trade 
initiation. The dependent variable, CDS Trading, equals one in and after the first year of CDS trading on 
a reference firm and zero prior to it. It equals zero for all non-CDS firms. Post-initiation years of CDS 
firms are excluded from the analysis. Credit Rating is a binary variable that equals one if a borrowing 
firm has a debt rating assigned by Standard & Poor’s and zero otherwise. Investment Grade is a binary 
variable that equals one if a borrowing firm has a credit rating assigned by Standard & Poor’s above 
BB+ and zero otherwise. Detailed definitions of other variables are in the legend of Table 2. Constant 
terms, two-digit SIC industry and year fixed effects are included in the regression, but they are not 
tabulated. The z-statistics in parentheses are calculated from the Huber/White/Sandwich 
heteroskedastic-consistent errors, which are also corrected for correlation across observations for a given 
firm. Panel B compares the firm characteristics of CDS firms with those of matched non-CDS firms. T-
tests are conducted to test for differences in mean values between CDS and non-CDS subsamples. The 
symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Probit model on the probability of CDS trade initiation 
Dependent variables CDS Trading 
Credit Rating 0.586*** 
 (9.3) 
Investment Grade 0.528*** 
 (7.8) 
Ln(Assets)  0.410*** 
 (15.6) 
Ln(Firm Age) 0.092*** 
 (3.3) 
Ln(PPE/Employees) 0.011 
 (0.5) 
R&D/Assets 0.982 
 (1.6) 
ROA -0.157 
 (-0.6) 
MB 0.036** 
 (2.1) 
Sales Growth 0.218*** 
 (4.7) 
Leverage 0.853*** 
 (6.8) 
Cash/Assets -0.338 
 (-1.6) 
Stock Volatility -5.583*** 
 (-3.4) 
Herfindahl 1.040* 
 (1.8) 
Herfindahl2 -1.014 
 (-1.5) 
  
Industry and year fixed effects Yes 
N/Pseudo R-squared 50,018/0.465 
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Panel B: Comparison of firm characteristics prior to CDS trade initiation 
 
Characteristics 
(1) 
CDS firm 
(2) 
Matched non-CDS firm 
(3) 
Difference 
Credit Rating 0.898 0.890 0.008 
Investment Grade 0.644 0.635 0.009 
Ln(Assets) 8.615 8.701 -0.086** 
Ln(Firm Age) 3.000 2.912 0.088** 
Ln(PPE/Employees) 4.454 4.496 -0.042 
R&D/Assets 0.021 0.019 0.001 
ROA 0.032 0.018 0.014** 
MB 1.967 1.906 0.061 
Sales Growth 0.142 0.155 -0.014 
Leverage 0.326 0.330 -0.004 
Cash/Assets 0.084 0.089 -0.006 
Stock Volatility 0.029 0.030 -0.001 
Herfindahl 0.155 0.145 0.011 
Herfindahl2 0.044 0.038 0.006 
Patent 66.973 70.442 -3.469 
Citation 50.711 51.888 -1.177 
Propensity Score 0.241 0.238 0.003 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics. 
The sample consists of CDS firms that CDS trading initiated between 1997 and 2008 and the matched non-CDS 
firms jointly. Patent is the number of patents applied for, during the current year, which are eventually granted. 
Citation is the total number of citations arising from patents. The citations are adjusted using the time-technology 
class fixed effects. Ln(1+Patent) is the log of one plus Patent. Ln(1+Citation) is the log of one plus Citation. CDS 
Trading is a binary variable that equals one after the introduction of CDS trading on a reference firm and zero 
otherwise. Daily Quotes is the average number of CDS daily quotes on a firm in a given year. Distinct Dealers is the 
average number of distinct dealers providing CDS quotes on a firm in a given year. Distinct Maturities is the average 
number of distinct maturities of CDS contract traded on a firm in a given year. Ln(Assets) is the log of a firm’s book 
value of total assets. Ln(Firm Age) is the log of the number of years since a firm enters the CRSP database. 
Ln(PPE/Employees) is the log of the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to the number of employees. 
R&D/Assets is the R&D expenses scaled by total assets, where missing R&D expenses are treated as zeros. ROA is 
EBIT scaled by total assets. MB is the market value of total assets scaled by the book value of total assets. Sales 
Growth is the log of one plus the change in net sales scaled by lagged net sales. Leverage is the book value of debts 
scaled by total assets. Cash/Assets is the cash holdings scaled by total assets. Stock Volatility is the standard 
deviation of daily stock returns over the fiscal year. Herfindahl is the sum of squared market shares in sales of a 
firm’s three-digit SIC industry. 
 
  
 
 
Variables 
(1) 
 
Observations 
(2) 
 
Mean 
(3) 
Standard 
deviation 
(4) 
 
Q1 
(5) 
 
Median 
(6) 
 
Q3 
Innovation measures 
Patent  16,636 78.148 261.783 0.000 0.000 14.000 
Citation  16,636 63.703 240.254 0.000 0.000 7.651 
Ln(1+Patent) 16,636 1.504 2.136 0.000 0.000 2.708 
Ln(1+Citation) 16,636 1.251 2.075 0.000 0.000 2.158 
       
CDS variables 
CDS Trading 16,636 0.268 0.443 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Daily Quotes 4,579 236 59 146 261 262 
Distinct Dealers 4,330 6.719 4.573 3.030 5.191 9.767 
Distinct Maturities 4,433 7.474 3.453 5.115 8.605 10.487 
       
Control variables in innovation regressions 
Ln(Assets) 16,636 8.588 1.526 7.480 8.400 9.789 
Ln(Firm Age) 16,636 3.061 0.818 2.485 3.178 3.714 
Ln(PPE/Employees) 16,636 4.454 1.400 3.470 4.291 5.266 
R&D/Assets 16,636 0.023 0.046 0.000 0.002 0.028 
ROA 16,636 0.088 0.088 0.048 0.084 0.131 
MB 16,636 1.863 1.374 1.158 1.465 2.019 
Sales Growth 16,636 0.105 0.288 -0.001 0.077 0.168 
Leverage 16,636 0.298 0.205 0.152 0.267 0.397 
Cash/Assets 16,636 0.105 0.121 0.023 0.063 0.140 
Stock Volatility 16,636 0.028 0.015 0.018 0.024 0.033 
Herfindahl 16,636 0.159 0.144 0.068 0.108 0.208 
Herfindahl2 16,636 0.046 0.108 0.005 0.012 0.043 
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Table 3 
Effect of CDS trading on innovation output. 
The sample consists of CDS firms that initiated CDS trading between 1997 and 2008 and the matched non-
CDS firms. Patent is the number of patents applied for, during the current year, which are eventually granted. 
Citation is the total number of citations arising from patents, which is adjusted using the time-technology class 
fixed effects. CDS Trading is a binary variable that equals one if a firm has CDS trading on its debt during a 
year and zero otherwise. Ln(Assets) is the log of a firm’s book value of total assets. Ln(Firm Age) is the log of 
the number of years since a firm enters the CRSP database. Ln(PPE/Employees) is the log of the ratio of net 
property, plant, and equipment to the number of employees. R&D/Assets is R&D expenses scaled by total assets. 
ROA is EBIT scaled by total assets. MB is the market value of total assets divided by the book value of total 
assets. Sales Growth is the log of one plus the change in net sales scaled by lagged net sales. Leverage is the 
book value of debts scaled by total assets. Cash/Assets is the cash holdings scaled by total assets. Stock Volatility 
is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the fiscal year. Except for Stock Volatility, which is 
measured between year t-1 and t, all explanatory variables are measured at t-1 in the regressions. Herfindahl is 
the sum of squared market shares in sales of a firm’s three-digit SIC industry. The t-statistics in parentheses are 
calculated from the Huber/White/Sandwich heteroskedastic-consistent errors, which are also corrected for 
correlation across observations for a given firm. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variables Ln(1+Patent)t Ln(1+Citation)t 
CDS Trading 0.147*** 0.199*** 
 (2.8) (3.0) 
Ln(Assets) 0.247*** 0.243*** 
 (6.2) (4.9) 
Ln(Firm Age) 0.153 0.297** 
 (1.5) (2.2) 
Ln(PPE/Employees) 0.286*** 0.341*** 
 (4.7) (4.4) 
R&D/Assets 0.339 0.507 
 (0.6) (0.6) 
ROA 0.117 -0.078 
 (0.6) (-0.3) 
MB 0.105*** 0.156*** 
 (9.1) (10.3) 
Sales Growth -0.074** -0.112** 
 (-2.4) (-2.4) 
Leverage -0.262** -0.512** 
 (-2.1) (-2.6) 
Cash/Assets 0.723*** 0.357 
 (3.9) (1.4) 
Stock Volatility 4.823*** 8.357*** 
 (3.2) (3.6) 
Herfindahl -0.461 0.485 
 (-0.6) (0.5) 
Herfindahl2 0.609 -0.247 
 (1.0) (-0.3) 
   
Firm and year fixed effects Yes Yes 
N/Adjusted R-squared 16,636/0.895 16,636/0.797 
 
 56 
 
Table 4 
Tests on endogeneity. 
The sample consists of CDS firms that initiated CDS trading between 1997 and 2008 and the matched non-CDS firms. 
All regressions include the same control variables as those used in Table 3, but their coefficients are not tabulated. Panel A 
presents the regressions results on the effects of CDS liquidity measures on innovation output. Panel B presents the 
regression results with state-by-year and industry-by-year fixed effects. Panel C presents the distribution of coefficient 
estimates of CDS Trading and associated t-statistics from regressions by randomizing the years of CDS trading initiation 
among the sample firms 1000 times. Panel D presents the regression results related to cov-lite loans. Panel D.1 presents the 
regression results controlling for the Cov-Lite indicator that equals one in and after the first year when the firm starts 
borrowing in the cov-lite loan market, and zero prior to it. Panel D.2 presents the regression results controlling for net fund 
inflows to collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) and loan mutual funds. Panel D.3 presents the regression results excluding 
firms with CDS introduction dates after the first quarter of 2005, and their corresponding control firms. Panel E presents the 
regression results controlling for other corporate governance measures. Panel F presents the regression results on the 
dynamics of innovation differentials between CDS and non-CDS firms over the years surrounding CDS trade initiation. 
Year-2 (Year-1) is a binary variable that takes the value of one if CDS trading initiates in two (one) years and zero otherwise. 
Year0 is a binary variable that equals one if CDS trading initiates this year and zero otherwise. Year+1 is a binary variable 
that equals one if CDS trading initiates one year ago and zero otherwise. Year≥+2 is a binary variable that equals one if CDS 
trading initiates two or more years ago and zero otherwise. Panel G presents the regression results controlling for bank size 
defined as the log of average total assets of firms’ bank lenders. Panel H presents the regression results controlling for past 
innovation investments, innovation success, and implied volatility. Panel I presents the third-stage estimation of the 
instrumental variable regression results. In the first-stage regression, we use Lender FX Hedging as the instrument to predict 
the probability of CDS trading. Lender FX Hedging is defined as the average of foreign exchange derivatives used for 
hedging purposes relative to total assets across the banks that have served as either lenders or bond underwriters for the firm 
over the previous five years. Panel J presents the regression results using the Anti-Recharacterization Law as an exogenous 
shock. Post AR is a binary variable that equals one after the enactment of anti-recharacterization laws in the state of a firm’s 
headquarter or incorporation, and zero otherwise. Detailed definitions of dependent variables and control variables can be 
found in the legend of Table 2. The t-statistics in parentheses are calculated from the Huber/White/Sandwich 
heteroskedastic consistent errors, which are clustered by firm. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Effects of CDS liquidity measures on innovation output using CDS firm-years only. 
 Ln(1+Patent)t Ln(1+Citation)t 
Panel A.1: Number of daily quotes (N = 4,579) 
Daily Quotes 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (4.2) (4.1) 
Panel A.2: Number of distinct dealers (N = 4,330) 
Distinct Dealers 0.014* 0.031*** 
 (1.8) (2.6) 
Panel A.3: Number of distinct maturities (N = 4,433) 
Distinct Maturities 0.042*** 0.055*** 
 (3.1) (2.9) 
   
Panel B: Controlling for state-by-year and industry-by-year fixed effects (N = 16,458) 
 Ln(1+Patent)t Ln(1+Citation)t 
CDS Trading 0.111** 0.086* 
 (2.5) (1.7) 
   
Panel C: Distribution of the coefficient of CDS Trading constructed using randomized CDS initiation dates (1,000 replications) 
 Ln(1+Patent)t Ln(1+Citation)t 
Mean 0.003 0.002 
 (0.173) (0.196) 
Median 0.007 0.008 
 (0.155) (0.116) 
1st percentile -0.121 -0.278 
 (-1.579) (-1.621) 
10th percentile  -0.065 -0.084 
 (-0.872) (-1.252) 
90th percentile 0.064 0.093 
 (1.197) (1.367) 
99th percentile 0.115 0.153 
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 (2.253) (2.293) 
   
Panel D: Testing the Cov-lite loan as an alternative explanation 
 Ln(1+Patent)t Ln(1+Citation)t 
Panel D.1: Controlling for the Cov-Lite indicator (N = 16,636) 
CDS Trading 0.144*** 0.195*** 
 (2.7) (2.9) 
Cov-Lite 0.526*** 0.588** 
 (3.0) (2.3) 
Panel D.2: Controlling for net fund inflows to CLOs and loan mutual funds (N = 10,231) 
CDS Trading 0.261*** 0.310*** 
 (4.4) (3.9) 
Inflow_CLO 0.001 -0.001 
 (1.3) (-0.3) 
Inflow_MF 0.070*** 0.096*** 
 (12.6) (7.2) 
Panel D.3: Excluding firms with CDS trading initiated after 2005: Q1 (N = 14,600) 
CDS Trading 0.130** 0.189*** 
 (2.2) (2.6) 
   
Panel E: Controlling for corporate governance measures (N = 5,317) 
 Ln(1+Patent)t Ln(1+Citation)t 
CDS Trading 0.104** 0.083* 
 (2.1) (1.9) 
G-index 0.018 0.020 
 (0.7) (1.0) 
Board Size 0.026 0.100 
 (0.2) (0.8) 
Institutional Ownership 0.323** 0.614*** 
 (2.1) (3.8) 
   
Panel F: Dynamics of the CDS effect on innovation over the years surrounding CDS trade initiation (N = 16,636) 
 Ln(1+Patent)t Ln(1+Citation)t 
Year-2 0.012 0.019 
 (0.5) (0.6) 
Year-1 0.006 0.000 
 (0.2) (0.0) 
Year0 0.035 0.073** 
 (1.1) (2.0) 
Year+1 0.087*** 0.134*** 
 (2.6) (3.1) 
Year≥+2 0.225*** 0.230** 
 (2.7) (2.3) 
   
Panel G: Controlling for the size of bank lenders (N = 4,377) 
 Ln(1+Patent)t Ln(1+Citation)t 
CDS Trading 0.225** 0.279** 
 (2.6) (2.2) 
Bank Size 0.039 0.001 
 (1.1) (0.0) 
   
Panel H: Controlling for past innovation investments, innovation success and implied volatility (N = 11,002) 
 Ln(1+Patent)t Ln(1+Citation)t 
CDS Trading 0.165*** 0.191*** 
 (3.0) (2.6) 
Past Innovation Investments 0.804 0.820 
 (0.7) (0.6) 
Past Innovation Success 0.613*** 0.503*** 
 (15.4) (8.7) 
Implied Volatility 0.101 -0.093 
 (0.5) (-0.4) 
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Panel I: Using Lender FX Hedging as an instrument (N = 16,636) 
 Ln(1+Patent)t Ln(1+Citation)t 
Instrumented CDS Trading 0.362** 0.514** 
 (2.0) (2.5) 
   
Panel J: Using Anti-Recharacterization Law as a natural experiment (N = 16,458) 
 Ln(1+Patent)t Ln(1+Citation)t 
CDS Trading 0.183*** 0.282*** 
 (3.3) (4.0) 
CDS Trading×Post AR -0.112* -0.229*** 
 (-1.9) (-2.9) 
Post AR  0.284*** 0.377*** 
 (4.8) (5.1) 
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Table 5 
Cross-sectional differences in the effects of CDS trading on innovation. 
The sample consists of CDS firms that initiated CDS trading between 1997 and 2008 and the matched non-
CDS firms. All regressions include the same control variables as those used in Table 3, but their coefficients are 
not tabulated. In Panel A, the sample is split according to the sample median level of debt dependence. Debt 
dependence is measured using the industry median fraction of investment financed by debt, i.e., the sum of net 
debt issued divided by the sum of capital expenditures and R&D expenses over the past decade. In Panel B, we 
partition the firms into two groups according to whether they have bank debt or not before the advent of CDS 
trading. In Panel C, we split the subsample with bank debt into two groups based on the median number of 
unique bank lenders over the five years prior to CDS trade initiation. In Panel D, firms with bank debt are 
divided into two groups according to whether or not their loan contracts contain secured debt or net worth 
covenants over the five years before CDS trading starts. In Panel E, the sample is split using the median 
probability of debt renegotiation measured by the average Altman’s Z-score in the past two years prior to CDS 
trade initiation. Detailed definitions of dependent variables and control variables can be found in the legend of 
Table 2. The t-statistics in parentheses are calculated from the Huber/White/Sandwich heteroskedastic consistent 
errors, which are clustered by firm. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variables Ln(1+Patent)t Ln(1+Citation)t 
Panel A: Partitioning the sample according to industry median debt dependence (Nhigh = 8,311; Nlow = 8,325)   High Low High Low 
CDS Trading 0.205*** 0.080 0.229*** 0.146 
(2.9) (1.1) (2.6) (1.6) 
     
Panel B: Partitioning the sample according to whether a firm has bank debt (Nyes = 5,351; Nno = 7,541) 
  Yes No Yes No 
CDS Trading 0.158** -0.005 0.174*** 0.036 
(2.1) (-0.1) (4.0) (0.4) 
     
Panel C: Partitioning firms with bank debt according to the number of bank lenders (Nlow = 2,658; Nhigh = 2,633)   Low High Low High 
CDS Trading 0.214* 0.073 0.299* 0.032 
 (1.8) (1.0) (1.7) (0.3) 
     
Panel D: Partitioning firms with bank debt according to loan covenants (Nyes = 3,136; Nno = 2,215)   Yes No Yes No 
CDS Trading 0.165* 0.075 0.162*** 0.090 
 (1.7) (0.6) (3.2) (0.5) 
     
Panel E: Partitioning the sample according to firms’ probability of debt renegotiation (Nlow = 6,683; Nhigh = 6,756) 
 Low High Low High 
CDS Trading 0.188*** 0.088 0.227** 0.077 
 (2.8) (0.9) (2.5) (0.8) 
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Table 6 
Effects of CDS trading on innovation strategies. 
The sample consists of CDS firms that initiated CDS trading between 1997 and 2008 and the matched non-
CDS firms. %Exploitative (%Exploratory) is the proportion of exploitative (exploratory) patents. A firm’s 
existing knowledge comprises its existing patents and the patents that its existing patents cite. A patent is 
categorized as exploitative if at least 60% of its citations are based on the firm’s existing knowledge, and as 
exploratory if at least 60% of its citations are based on new knowledge (i.e., patents not in the firm’s existing 
knowledge). Patents falling into the International Patent Classification (IPC) category B01 are defined as 
process patents, and all other patents are defined as product patents. Process (Product) is the natural logarithm 
of one plus the number of process (product) patents applied for by each firm each year. The originality score of 
a patent as one minus the Herfindahl index of the three-digit technology class distribution of all the patents that 
the patent cites. Originality is the mean originality score of a firm’s patents in each year. Detailed definitions of 
control variables are in the legend of Table 2. The t-statistics in parentheses are calculated from the 
Huber/White/Sandwich heteroskedastic consistent errors, which are clustered by firm. The symbols ***, **, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variables % Exploitative  %Exploratory Process Product Originality 
CDS Trading -0.027*** 0.025** 0.027 0.149*** 0.029*** 
 (-2.7) (2.2) (1.3) (2.8) (3.2) 
Ln(Assets) 0.001 0.012 0.020* 0.246*** 0.005 
 (0.1) (1.1) (1.7) (6.2) (0.5) 
Ln(Firm Age) 0.143*** -0.182*** 0.129*** 0.152 -0.023 
 (8.0) (-8.9) (3.1) (1.5) (-1.1) 
Ln(PPE/Employees) -0.055*** 0.046*** 0.013 0.285*** 0.010 
 (-4.8) (3.4) (1.1) (4.7) (0.8) 
R&D/Assets 0.092 -0.008 -0.002 0.320 0.118
 (0.8) (-0.1) (-0.0) (0.5) (1.4) 
ROA 0.070 -0.030 0.137** 0.118 -0.011 
 (1.4) (-0.6) (2.3) (0.6) (-0.2) 
MB -0.008*** 0.009*** 0.004 0.105*** -0.002 
 (-3.7) (3.7) (0.8) (9.1) (-1.3) 
Sales Growth 0.047*** -0.066*** -0.004 -0.072** 0.013 
 (3.7) (-4.6) (-0.3) (-2.4) (1.3) 
Leverage 0.062* -0.066* 0.096*** -0.274** 0.029 
 (1.9) (-1.8) (3.0) (-2.2) (1.0) 
Cash/Assets 0.185*** -0.162*** 0.222* 0.722*** 0.039 
 (4.8) (-3.9) (1.8) (3.9) (1.1) 
Stock Volatility -0.289 0.513 0.966 4.871*** -0.682* 
 (-0.7) (1.2) (1.5) (3.3) (-1.7) 
Herfindahl -0.145 0.149 -0.071 -0.486 -0.162 
 (-0.8) (0.7) (-0.3) (-0.7) (-0.7) 
Herfindahl2 0.184 -0.204 0.126 0.628 0.276 
 (1.1) (-1.1) (0.7) (1.0) (1.5)
      
Firm and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N/Adjusted R-squared 7,775/0.575 7,775/0.580 16,632/0.707 16,632/0.895 6,982/0.381 
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Table 7 
Testing the financing channel as an alternative explanation. 
The sample consists of CDS firms that initiated CDS trading between 1997 and 2008 and the matched non-CDS 
firms. All regressions include the same control variables as those used in Table 3, but their coefficients are not 
tabulated. In Panel A, the sample is divided into more financially constrained (MFC) and less financially constrained 
(LFC) using classification schemes based on firm size (Ln(Assets)), the dividend payer indicator, and Whited and 
Wu’s (2006) financial constraints index (the WW index). A firm is defined as MFC (LFC) if its size is below (above) 
the sample median, if it pays zero (non-zero) dividends, or if its WW index is above (below) the sample median. In 
Panel B, the sample is divided into high institutional ownership and low institutional ownership according to the 
sample median. Institutional ownership is defined as the fraction of shares outstanding held by institutional investors 
from Thomson 13f. Panel C presents the regression results on the effect of CDS trading on R&D/Assets. Detailed 
definitions of dependent variables and control variables can be found in the legend of Table 2. Both firm and year 
fixed effects are included in all regressions. The t-statistics in parentheses are calculated from the 
Huber/White/Sandwich heteroskedastic consistent errors, which are clustered by firm. The symbols ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Partitioning the sample using financial constraints measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variables Ln(1+Patent)t Ln(1+Citation)t LFC MFC LFC MFC 
A.1. Partitioning the sample according to firm size (NLFC = 8,295; NMFC = 8,341) 
CDS Trading 0.203** 0.069 0.316*** 0.026 
(2.2) (1.5) (3.0) (0.4) 
A.2. Partitioning the sample according to dividend payer indicator (NLFC = 10,274; NMFC = 6,362) 
CDS Trading 0.155** 0.031 0.224*** 0.053 
(2.4) (0.5) (2.7) (0.6) 
A.3. Partitioning the sample according to Whited and Wu’s (2006) financial constraints index (NLFC = 8,222; NMFC = 8,213) 
CDS Trading 0.215** 0.029 0.331*** -0.030 
(2.4) (0.6) (3.2) (-0.5) 
     
Panel B: Partitioning the sample according to institutional ownership (Nhigh = 8,315; Nlow = 8,321) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variables Ln(1+Patent)t Ln(1+Citation)t 
 High Low High Low 
CDS Trading 0.071 0.193** 0.076 0.339*** 
 (1.5) (2.2) (1.0) (3.3) 
 
Panel C: Effect of CDS trading on R&D   
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variables R&Dt R&Dt 
CDS Trading -0.002 -0.002 
 (-1.6) (-1.4) 
R&Dt-1 0.166***  
 (3.0)  
N/R-squared 16,636/0.927 16,636/0.920
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Table 8 
CDS trading, innovation efficiency, and the economic value of patents. 
The sample consists of CDS firms that initiated CDS trading between 1997 and 2008 and the matched non-CDS firms. Patent/R&D is the number of patents over the 
average R&D expenditures in the past five years. Citation/R&D is the number of citations over the average R&D expenditures in the past five years. Citationതതതതതതതതതത is the 
average citation count per patent. CW_Patent is the number of citation-weighted patents. Patent Value is the sum of estimated patent value from Kogan et al. (2017). 
Detailed definitions of other variables can be found in the legend of Table 2. The t-statistics in parentheses are calculated from the Huber/White/Sandwich 
heteroskedastic consistent errors, which are clustered by firm. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variables Ln(1+Patent/R&D)t Ln(1+Citation/R&D)t Ln(1+Citationതതതതതതതതതത)t Ln(1+CW_Patent)t Ln(1+Patent Value)t
CDS Trading 0.020** 0.026** 0.036** 0.147** 0.081** 
 (2.3) (2.3) (2.2) (2.4) (2.4) 
Ln(Assets) -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.005 0.267*** 0.299*** 
 (-3.2) (-3.7) (-0.4) (5.8) (10.1) 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.001 0.007 0.120*** 0.179 0.271*** 
 (-0.2) (0.9) (3.5) (1.5) (3.9) 
Ln(PPE/Employees) 0.018* 0.011 0.055*** 0.328*** 0.364*** 
 (1.9) (0.8) (3.1) (4.8) (9.6) 
R&D/Assets -0.510*** -0.534*** 0.162 0.641 1.414** 
 (-3.5) (-3.1) (0.4) (1.0) (2.5) 
ROA -0.097 -0.073 -0.261*** 0.040 0.301* 
 (-1.5) (-0.8) (-2.9) (0.2) (1.8) 
MB 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.055*** 0.120*** 0.183*** 
 (3.1) (2.9) (8.8) (9.4) (15.5) 
Sales Growth 0.117*** 0.133*** -0.045*** -0.071** -0.086*** 
 (4.3) (4.1) (-2.6) (-2.1) (-2.7) 
Leverage -0.121*** -0.124*** -0.248*** -0.348** -0.255*** 
 (-3.7) (-3.1) (-5.0) (-2.3) (-2.6) 
Cash/Assets 0.073* 0.068 -0.441*** 0.678*** 0.126 
 (1.7) (0.9) (-5.1) (3.4) (0.8) 
Stock Volatility -0.093 0.485 2.494*** 5.703*** 8.007***
 (-0.2) (0.8) (6.1) (3.3) (6.5) 
Herfindahl 0.084 -0.035 1.063*** 0.011 2.022*** 
 (0.7) (-0.3) (4.2) (0.0) (3.7) 
Herfindahl2 -0.080 0.026 -0.906*** 0.206 -1.440** 
 (-0.6) (0.2) (-3.6) (0.3) (-2.5) 
      
Firm and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N/R-squared 9,057/0.558 9,057/0.543 16,636/0.310 16,636/0.884 16,018/0.864 
